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ABSTRACT 
 The United States government has utilized leadership decapitation strategies to 
counter illicit or insurgent organizations since the kingpin strategy was first developed in 
the late 20th century by the Drug Enforcement Administration. Most critical analysis of 
this strategy, however, deals with terrorist organizations rather than transnational criminal 
organizations (TCOs). This thesis looks to the findings in these critical studies that may 
also be relevant to countering TCOs and, based on them, asks: what are the main factors 
that determine the effectiveness of leadership decapitation in countering TCOs? This 
thesis applies the four factors found in the literature to impact vulnerability to leadership 
decapitation—institutionalization, popular support, history of violent rivalry, and law 
enforcement efforts—to four TCOs. It finds that Medellin and Cali cartels did not gain an 
advantage from any of the factors. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC) received protection from leadership decapitation from three of the four factors 
but ultimately was defeated. In the final case, the Sinaloa cartel, all four factors were 
present to provide the organization with protection from decapitation. These results are 
important for governments and law enforcement organizations to understand as they 
work to defeat TCOs. 
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1 
I. INDICATORS OF SUCCESSFUL 
LEADERSHIP DECAPITATION OF A 
TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION  
The strategy of “leadership decapitation,” also known as the kingpin strategy, has 
long been a foreign policy practice applied by the United States in the Middle East and 
Latin America and has only grown in prominence since 2001 and the hunt for Osama Bin 
Laden.1 Leadership decapitation has various academic definitions, but, in this thesis, it 
refers to the removal, either by arrest or death, of a top leader of a terrorist organization 
or a Transnational Criminal Organization (TCO). Some literature in the field analyzes the 
removal of mid-level leaders, while this thesis focuses specifically on leadership change 
at the top.2 This strategy is different from targeted assassination because the leaders 
targeted under leadership decapitation are all leaders of criminal enterprises and are 
themselves criminals or, in some cases, designated as terrorists. 
The strategy of leadership decapitation has been utilized by the United States 
since the 1990s to counter TCOs such as the Medellin and Cali Cartels, but there has 
been little critical analysis of its effectiveness.3 Due to the strategic interests of the 
United States post-9/11, much of the research into the effectiveness of “leadership 
decapitation” of criminal organizations has been focused on the Middle East. Despite the 
far-reaching implications of the prevalence of TCOs, which are organizations with 
                                                 
1 Jenna Jordan, “Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark: Why Terrorist Groups Survive Decapitation 
Strikes,” International Security 38, no 4 (Spring 2014), http://search.proquest.com/docview/1535269313/; 
H. Richard Friman, “Forging the Vacancy Chain: Law Enforcement Efforts and Mobility in Criminal 
Economies,” Crime, Law, and Social Change 41, no. 1 (February 2004): 53–77, https://doi-
org.libproxy.nps.edu/10.1023/B:CRIS.0000015328.82955.f0; Brian J. Phillips, “How Does Leadership 
Decapitation Affect Violence? The Case of Drug Trafficking Organizations in Mexico,” The Journal of 
Politics 77, no. 2 (February 2015): 324–336, https://doi.org/10.1086/680209; Bryan C. Price, “Targeting 
Top Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to Counterterrorism,” International Security 36, 
no. 4 (March 2012): 9–46, http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/41428119; Michael Kenney, “From 
Pablo to Osama: Counter-terrorism Lessons from the War on Drugs,” Survival 45, no. 3 (Autumn 2003): 
187–206, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2003.9688585. 
2 June S. Beittel, Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations, CRS Report No. 
R41576 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2018), 1–8, 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf; Phillips, “How Does Leadership Decapitation Affect Violence?,” 
325–333; Friman, “Forging the Vacancy Chain,” 60–62.  
3 Robert J. Nieves, “Colombian Cocaine Cartels: Lessons from the Front,” Trends in Organized Crime 
2, no. 4 (June 1997), 36–39, http://dx.doi.org.libproxy.nps.edu/10.1007/s12117-997-1071-6. 
2 
diversified illicit business ventures and markets in multiple countries, very little academic 
research has addressed the long-term effectiveness of this strategy in countering Latin 
American-based TCOs. 
This thesis thus asks the following question: what are the main factors that 
determine the effectiveness of leadership decapitation in countering TCOs? The case 
studies examined in this thesis are primarily Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) that 
diversified their illegal products to include human and arms trafficking, smuggling, 
counterfeiting, etc., and expanded into international markets, thereby becoming TCOs. 
Additionally, this thesis will answer the following sub-questions. Is leadership 
decapitation a viable strategy against these organizations? Are there instances or 
circumstances where “leadership decapitation” techniques are counter-productive?  
Answering these questions is important because TCOs destabilize and erode the 
states where they are based, which, in turn, is of strategic importance to the United 
States.4 Central and South America have consistently become the base of operations for 
TCOs due to their role as producers or transit zones of illicit goods, from drugs to 
counterfeit items; these groups also maintain a global reach operationally through 
transnational networks.5 The presence of TCOs in the Latin American region undermines 
the welfare and stability of host states, both directly and indirectly. Through violence and 
intimidation, they undermine the rule of law; and because states must use valuable 
resources to combat TCOs, state capacity to support infrastructure and provide public 
goods is reduced.6  
Whether or not leadership decapitation can be successfully utilized to counter 
modern Latin America-based TCOs is a critical knowledge gap for the NORTHCOM and 
SOUTHCOM Lines of Effort (LOE) to counter threat networks and defend homeland 
                                                 
4 Beittel, Mexico, 8–9; Angel Rabasa et al., Counternetwork, RR 1481-A (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 
2017), 1–12, 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1400/RR1481/RAND_RR1481.pdf. 
5 Rabasa et al., Counternetwork, xiv–xvi; Beittel, Mexico, 8–9. 
6 Beittel, Mexico, 8–9; Kenney, “From Pablo to Osama,” 188–189. 
3 
security.7 The knowledge generated in this thesis can help to expand understanding of the 
operating environment as it pertains to countering these organizations and provide a 
critical understanding of when leadership decapitation may be a viable option to counter 
TCOs. This research could also help answer additional questions, such as whether the 
removal of key personnel other than leaders has the effect of disrupting or eliminating an 
organization and whether different methods of removal—death or imprisonment—have 
an impact on its effectiveness. 
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The existing literature on decapitation focuses more on terrorist organizations 
than on TCOs. This literature review examines how effectiveness of leadership 
decapitation has been defined in previous research and then adapts that definition to this 
thesis. Then, it evaluates the studies on the application of leadership decapitation to 
terrorist organizations in order to assess their applicability to TCOs. Furthermore, it 
analyzes the critical internal and external factors that can be used to predict the 
effectiveness of leadership removal. Finally, this literature review assesses the long-term 
consequences of a successful leadership decapitation operation in terms of disrupting the 
target organization and various side effects. 
1. Defining Effectiveness 
Measuring the effectiveness of leadership decapitation strategies on TCOs 
depends largely on how that effectiveness is defined. Gonzalez defines the success of this 
strategy as the dissolution or disruption of the targeted group or its elimination from the 
host region.8 Gonzalez’ definition only examines the short-term effects of leadership 
removal, and while this analysis is important for measuring the success of individual 
operations, it does not account for the possible long-term consequences: after all, the 
                                                 
7 “Mission Statement,” NORTHCOM, accessed March 30, 2018, http://www.northcom.mil/About-
USNORTHCOM/; “Countering Threat Networks,” SOUTHCOM, accessed March 30, 2018, 
http://www.southcom.mil/Lines-of-Effort/Countering-Threat-Networks/; “Mission Statement,” 
SOUTHCOM, accessed March 30, 2018, http://www.southcom.mil/About/. 
8 Edgar Gonzalez Jr, “On Drugs and Cartels: History and Strategy,” Harvard Political Review, last 
modified April 9, 2016, http://harvardpolitics.com/world/cartels/. 
4 
group in question may have dissolved, but other groups may have taken up its operations. 
Other scholars in the field define success of leadership decapitation as a reduction in 
organized transnational criminal activities in the region in which the targeted 
organization predominantly operated.9 Given the complex and lucrative environment that 
TCOs operate in, a definition of success that accounts for the long-term consequences of 
eliminating one group from a competitive market is more appropriate for this study. For 
that reason, this thesis will measure success as the long-term results in the target area 
(region, state, neighborhood) of the action taken by the state or other organization 
compared to the initial intent. For example, if the intent or purpose of forcing leadership 
change in a TCO was to remove the criminal element from the region or reduce the 
amount of trafficking there, then the strategy would be ineffective if the criminal 
operations were ongoing under a different TCO. This metric of success sets a high bar 
and may require a unified, whole-of-government approach because it requires a solution 
to the underlying problems that allow these groups to function. Discussion of those 
problems and how to solve them falls outside the scope of this research but are important 
points to consider when analyzing counter-TCO strategies.10 
2. Utilizing Terrorism Research to Analyze TCOs 
As was previously discussed, the literature on leadership decapitation is 
principally focused on terrorist organizations. This research is most applicable to this 
thesis when it accounts for the impact of different motivating factors—namely, a terrorist 
organization’s values-driven motivation versus TCOs’ profit-driven motivation. The 
majority of the research on terrorist organizations implies that the ideological foundations 
                                                 
9 Price, “Targeting Top Terrorists,” 9–12; Friman, “Forging the Vacancy Chain” 59–62; Jordan, 
“Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark.” 
10 Stewart M. Patrick, “How to Attack Transnational Crime,” Council on Foreign Relations, last 
modified July 9, 2012, https://www.cfr.org/blog/how-attack-transnational-crime; Yuriy A. Voronin, 
“Measures to Control Transnational Organized Crime, Summary” (unpublished report, last modified 
October 5, 2000), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/184773.pdf; Paulette Lloyd, Beth Simmons, 
and Brandon Stewart, “Combating Transnational Crime: The Role of Learning and Norm Diffusion in the 
Current Rule of Law Wave,” in The Dynamics of the Rule of Law, eds. Andre Nolkaemper, Michael Zurn, 
and Randy Peerenboom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 153–180; James O. Finckenauer, 
“Meeting the Challenge of Transnational Crime,” National Institute of Justice Journal (July 2000), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/jr000244b.pdf. 
5 
of these groups impact the effectiveness of the leadership decapitation strategy by making 
them more susceptible during their foundational period and less susceptible once those 
ideas are institutionalized.11 While the research on terrorist organizations is useful for 
research such as case studies or quantitative methods, it is important to note that 
ideological, or values-driven, organizations such as terrorist groups and profit-driven 
TCOs are behaviorally and ideologically different and that, therefore, they may respond 
differently to leadership decapitation.12 Price lays out the specific variables that 
differentiate terrorist organizations (values-based organizations) from TCOs (profit-based 
organizations).13 He argues that values-based organizations are more susceptible to 
decapitation due to the higher level of importance they place on the individual leader in 
framing the vision of the organization. These leaders are transformational, charismatic, 
and crucial to a values-based organization’s survivability and expansion. Price’s study 
shows that values-based organizations are more likely to end after decapitation than other 
organizations; Phillips agrees with this assessment.14 These studies suggest that 
decapitation may not be effective against profit-based organizations such as TCOs. 
Scholars analyzing TCOs fall into two categories based on the motivations of the 
groups they are studying: ideological or profit. Regardless of their differences, some 
utility can be taken from applying lessons learned from ideological groups and their 
highly centralized operations as described by Price and Phillips. Price’s and Phillips’ 
studies on terrorist organizations are convincing when analyzing the TCOs most common 
today but are less compelling when discussing the dominant TCOs of the late 20th 
century. This difference in applicability is due to the adaptive nature of TCOs: before 
leadership decapitation was widely implemented to counter TCOs, these organizations 
                                                 
11 Jordan, “Why Terrorist Groups Survive Decapitation Strikes”; Phillips, “How Does Leadership 
Decapitation Affect Violence?,” 324–336. 
12 Anders Ulstein, “The Narco-terrorism Connection,” EURAD, March 6, 2010, 
http://www.eurad.net/en/news/supply_reduction/The%20narco-terrorism%20connection.9UFRjY0z.ips; H. 
Richard Friman, “Drug Markets and the Selective Use of Violence,” Crime, Law and Social Change 52, no. 
3 (September 2009): 285–286, https://doi-org.libproxy.nps.edu/10.1007/s10611-009-9202-4; Price, 
“Targeting Top Terrorists,” 14–23.  
13 Price, “Targeting Top Terrorists,” 14–23. 
14 Price, “Targeting Top Terrorists,” 43–46; Phillips, “How Does Leadership Decapitation Affect 
Violence?,” 327. 
6 
tended toward centralized power and charismatic leaders. The structure of groups from 
this time period allow for a more direct analysis utilizing terrorism studies.  
After the successful decapitation campaigns of the late 20th century, however, 
these organizations fragmented and established institutional structures aimed at reducing 
their susceptibility to leadership removal. For example, following the dissolution of the 
Medellin and Cali cartels, new groups developed different structures to minimize the 
vulnerability created by relying on a small number of leaders for all decision-making. 
Kenney’s study examines this difference in the TCOs of the past versus the present by 
contrasting Colombian TCOs of the 1970s with Colombian TCOs of the 2000s.15 He 
finds that the earlier TCOs were highly centralized wheel networks and highly 
susceptible to decapitation. When analyzing the TCOs that developed after the fall of the 
initial organizations, his findings agree with Price and Phillips: the newer groups were 
more likely to be decentralized chain networks with much less importance put on a 
specific leader.16 This distinction between groups of the past and the present is essential 
when examining why a leadership removal strategy could have been successful in the 
recent past but may not enjoy the same level of success now. In other words, TCOs may 
have adapted to counter this strategy, while the strategy has not adapted to account for 
their changes. 
3. Defining the Critical Internal Factors in Predicting Effectiveness 
The literature suggests that internal and external factors are critical in predicting 
the results of leadership decapitation on a specific organization regardless of whether the 
underlying drivers for the group are values or profit.17 Internally, if a TCO establishes 
and codifies strong institutions that uphold its bureaucracy and infrastructure, then it 
significantly reduces its susceptibility to leadership decapitation. Jordan, Price, and 
                                                 
15 Kenney, “From Pablo to Osama,” 187–190. 
16 Phillips, “How Does Leadership Decapitation Affect Violence?,” 326–329; Price, “Targeting Top 
Terrorists,” 18–19, 22–23; Kenney, “From Pablo to Osama,” 194–196. 
17 Jordan, “Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark”; Price, “Targeting Top Terrorists,” 9–46; Friman, 
“Drug Markets and the Selective Use of Violence,” 53–77; Brian J. Phillips, “Enemies with Benefits? 
Violent Rivalry and Terrorist Group Longevity,” Journal of Peace Research 52, no. 1 (2015), 62–75, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343314550538. 
7 
Kenney agree that there is a correlation in terrorist organizations between these factors 
and the survivability of the organization.18 Jordan argues that as a group ages, its 
institutions, bureaucracy, and infrastructure strengthen and that older groups are, 
therefore, more resilient to leadership decapitation.19 Price furthers this point and asserts 
that once a group has reached the 20-year mark, the state or organization countering the 
TCO may need may need to consider alternative methods to achieve their desired 
results.20  
Furthermore, some scholars argue that well-established bureaucratically 
structured organizations are unlikely to collapse due to a forced leadership change.21 
According to Beittel and Kenney, the leaders of modern TCOs are interchangeable due to 
their organizations’ predominantly decentralized chain network framework, suggesting 
they would not be susceptible to a decapitation strategy.22 These networks operate as 
separate cells, each cell conducting its business with other cells along a decentralized 
relay system, with the leader mainly in charge of oversight.23 By contrast, this research 
suggests a TCO would be more susceptible to leadership decapitation if it emphasizes a 
charismatic leader or has a centralized bureaucracy with weak supporting institutions.  
Unlike organizations that are dependent on a charismatic leader, however, today’s 
TCOs typically rise from local crime syndicates or DTOs to a transnational level by 
modeling themselves after successful corporations and businesses.24 This modeling 
means that by the time the organization develops into a TCO, it will have standardized 
                                                 
18 Beittel, Rabasa et al., and Friman state that these factors are also at work in TCOs, but it is not the 
subject of their research. Price, “Targeting Top Terrorists,” 43–46; Jordan, “Attacking the Leader, Missing 
the Mark”; Kenney, “From Pablo to Osama,” 194–198. 
19 Jordan, “Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark.” 
20 Jordan, “Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark.” 
21 Jordan, “Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark”; Phillips, “How Does Leadership Decapitation 
Affect Violence?,” 333–334; Friman, “Forging the Vacancy Chain,” 60–61. 
22 Beittel, Mexico, 24–28; Kenney, “From Pablo to Osama,” 192–196. 
23 Kenney, “From Pablo to Osama,” 194–198. 
24 Beittel, Mexico, 5–9; Friman, “Drug Markets and the Selective Use of Violence,” 286–287; Jordan, 
“Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark”; Channing May, “The Business of Transnational Crime,” Global 
Financial Integrity, April 11, 2017, http://www.gfintegrity.org/buiness-transnational -crime/; Tom 
Wainwright, Narco-nomics: How to Run a Drug Cartel (New York: PublicAffairs, 2016), 2–7.  
8 
operating procedures and a clear chain of command. By promoting this level of 
institutionalization and defining a potential line of succession, the TCO can protect itself 
from the long-term effects of leadership decapitation. The founding leaders are integral to 
this process because they can determine the infrastructure, bureaucracy, and institutional 
strength of their organization and push the organization to a more decentralized structure. 
However, Jordan and Price disagree about the importance of charismatic leaders 
in extremely violent organizations, with Jordan arguing that the leader’s charisma 
becomes institutionalized as the organization ages. If a charismatic leader wants to 
guarantee their group’s longevity past their own role, then it is in their best interests to 
use their charisma to develop strong institutions within their group with the goal of 
carrying out and supporting their vision. Price contends that the organization’s 
vulnerability to the state or a rival group makes them more susceptible to instability 
during leadership change.25 Furthermore, he reasons that leaders of these groups should 
resist the institutionalization posited by Jordan because it makes them more vulnerable to 
state infiltration or a coup from within the group.26 While both studies offer potentially 
useful information, the TCOs of today appear to institutionalize charisma as a safeguard 
against law enforcement’s and rival groups’ efforts to force a leadership change. Overall, 
Jordan’s argument could explain why the TCOs of today may be less reliant on a specific 
leader; Price’s argument may explain why the TCOs of the late 20th century refused to 
decentralize even when it became apparent the leaders were at risk of forcible removal. 
4. Defining the Critical External Factors in Predicting Effectiveness 
Studies have found that a terrorist organization or TCO’s ability to survive 
leadership decapitation increases with high levels of popular support and a history of 
violent rivalry with law enforcement or competitors.27 This finding is agreed upon by the 
central authors in the literature, with some analyzing the factors that could explain this 
trend. Jordan posits that there are six functions that popular support fulfills to increase the 
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organization’s chances of survival following an unexpected change in leadership.28 First, 
popular support allows for a broader pool of candidates for recruitment. Second, the 
community can help protect the organization by aiding its members in avoiding security 
forces. Third, it provides the group with a measure of legitimacy for their actions. This 
legitimacy offers the basis for the fourth and fifth functions, which are the acceptance or 
promotion of the organization’s use of violence by the populace and the endurance of its 
political or ideological relevance. Finally, community support provides for the 
organization by facilitating its acquisition of resources.29 
Phillips further theorizes that groups that undergo conflict become more adaptive 
to change, open to innovation, flexible in their strategies, and cohesive in their member 
base.30 His study indicates that violent competing groups tended to survive longer than 
those without violent rivalry. Because he was analyzing terrorist groups, which are 
ideologically driven, his findings show that rivalry did not influence a group’s longevity 
when the organizations involved had the same goal or vision—for example, supporting a 
right-wing government. Conversely, TCOs are profit-driven and more likely to 
experience benefits from rivalry with each other despite both groups having a profit-
maximizing goal. The profit incentive implies that TCOs will have more motivation to 
end the competition through elimination of the other group since this result means more 
potential profit for the surviving group. This theory agrees with Friman’s argument that 
TCO’s use violence to regulate their market and cement their interests. Law enforcement 
efforts can also act as another form of violent rivalry and, as such, should produce the 
same advantages. In sum, when violent rivalries occur between two TCOs, one group will 
have to cede to the other or risk being severely weakened or eliminated by the ensuing 
violence, but groups that survive this rivalry are likely to be less susceptible to leadership 
decapitation. 
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5. Examining the Consequences 
If leadership decapitation strategies are pursued to counter TCOs, there could be 
unintended side effects due to the creation of power vacuums, new vacancy chains as 
described by Friman, and increases in violence that, in turn, could compromise the 
potential for the success of this strategy. Friman, Jordan, Kenney, and Phillips agree that 
decapitation efforts that disrupt the targeted group create opportunities for rival and 
emerging groups by creating a power vacuum.31 They posit that as these opportunities 
arise, there will be a corresponding rise in violence and criminal activity as rival and 
emerging groups compete to control new market opportunities. These groups can be 
expected to employ violence selectively as a market regulator since legal regulations are 
absent due to the illicit nature of the markets concerned.32 TCOs are predominantly 
financially motivated, with large profit margins for leaders and other high-level members. 
Due to this monetary incentive, TCOs use violence selectively to protect market interests, 
territory, and networks, and, as a result, leadership decapitation will only affect violence 
in the region if the leader’s removal disrupts the targeted group enough to create 
perceived market opportunities for rival groups.33 When rival groups perceive the 
targeted group’s hold on its piece of the market or its network to be weakening, there is 
likely to be a corresponding rise in violence as they vie for control of the targeted group’s 
holdings. Once a group exerts steady control over those opportunities, the violence in the 
region will likely return to the status quo from before the instability caused by the 
decapitation.  
Friman’s vacancy chain theory furthers this argument by predicting that the 
disruption of the targeted group will cause it to relinquish some of its holdings in the 
market, which are desirable to other groups.34 Those groups take the new opportunities 
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and, in doing so, abandon some of their less lucrative holdings for other groups to take, 
and this continues down the chain.35 Additionally, he argues that decapitation creates a 
long vacancy chain within the targeted organization as intermediate-level members move 
up to top positions, which will eventually open entry-level positions at the lower levels. 
Friman’s vacancy chain theory could explain the high levels of fragmentation seen 
following the decapitation of major DTOs (TCOs) in Central and South America.36 These 
studies offer potentially relevant theories to explain the growth of TCOs in the Western 
Hemisphere despite focused elimination policies and tactics.   
B. HYPOTHESES 
TCOs are profit-driven organizations that operate and organize in ways similar to 
large licit transnational corporations.37 Additionally, while the driving motivations 
behind TCOs are fundamentally different from those of terrorist organizations—with 
TCOs motivated by profit and terrorist organizations by values—the two share the same 
internal and external factors that determine their organizational resiliency. This thesis 
tests the factors that the literature shows are applicable to terrorist organizations on TCOs 
to see if they are generalizable to these groups and assesses their impact on the 
effectiveness of leadership decapitation. To conduct this assessment, this thesis analyzes 
historical cases of leadership decapitation on TCOs utilizing the identified factors and 
then determines which, if any, hold true with these types of organizations. While these 
factors are not necessarily mutually exclusive, they may, through application, display a 
cumulative effect. Furthermore, this thesis assesses whether the lucrativeness of the illicit 
market of TCOs creates an overriding drive such that leadership decapitation alone will 
not achieve long-term success in defeating the market supporting them.  
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Ultimately, this thesis tests two hypotheses: First, it tests the hypothesis that 
decentralized TCOs high levels of popular support and a history of violent rivalries with 
other TCOs or the government will be less susceptible to a leadership decapitation 
strategy than those that are centralized with low levels of popular support and no history 
or violent rivalry. Second, it assesses whether the profitability of the enterprise makes 
TCOs less vulnerable to leadership decapitation than ideological groups. 
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis compares case studies of TCOs in Mexico and Colombia that have 
experienced leadership decapitation in their past. The four case studies are TCOs that 
have organized structures similar to large transnational corporations in the legal market: 
Medellin cartel, Cali cartel, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and the 
Sinaloa cartel.38 Following leadership decapitation, the Medellin and Cali cartels 
collapsed, the FARC entered into negotiations and transitioned into a legitimate 
organization, and the Sinaloa cartel continued operations. The Mexico- and Colombia-
based TCOs were chosen due to the different backgrounds of groups originating from 
these areas, as Colombia-based groups mostly started as drug producing and trafficking 
organizations, while Mexico-based organizations mostly started as drug trafficking 
organizations. The Medellin cartel is included to showcase the evolution of TCOs, since 
it fell in the 1990s, and how that influenced the effectiveness of leadership decapitation 
as a strategy. The Cali cartel depicts the effects of surviving violent rivalry and multiple 
decapitations.39 The relationship between the Medellin and Cali cartels also depicts the 
significance of allies and violent rivals in determining the organization’s vulnerability to 
leadership decapitation. Meanwhile, the FARC illustrates the potential differences 
between profit-motivated TCOs such as the previously discussed organizations and 
politically driven organizations that expanded into TCOs. The Sinaloa cartel was selected 
due to the differences in revenue, origin, and longevity from the Colombian examples. 
The Sinaloa cartel originated as a drug trafficking organization, then diversified by 
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focusing on lucrative markets such as counterfeiting, trafficking, and smuggling, and 
tends to avoid unnecessary violence.40 The Sinaloa cartel is also an example of how 
TCOs are affected by multiple leadership changes and how police corruption can 
influence the effectiveness of decapitation.41  
In analyzing each group, this thesis gives a brief background as well as an update 
on their current status and operations. Then, each chapter in this thesis utilizes each of the 
hypothesized key indicators for predicting the success of leadership decapitation 
(institutionalization, popular support, history with rivals and allies, and law enforcement 
efforts) in regard to that organization and then predicts whether leadership decapitation 
should have been effective against that particular group and in the region. In cases where 
there are critical nuances for that organization such as cumulative decapitation or 
increased law enforcement efforts, this thesis discusses how those may or may not affect 
the predicted result. If an organization experienced multiple decapitations, this thesis only 
re-analyzes the cases where the organization changed in a way that could affect the 
prediction between decapitations. When it is probable that law enforcement efforts made 
a significant impact on an organization leading up to a decapitation, this impact is 
analyzed and taken into account in the final prediction. Finally, this thesis compares the 
prediction for each group to the historical reality; then the immediate results versus the 
long-term results are compared to evaluate the overall success. Following the case 
studies, this thesis addresses the findings and their corresponding implications for policy. 
D. OUTLINE 
This first chapter gives a theoretical background to the overarching discussion on 
the effectiveness of leadership decapitation and what potential factors could affect 
effectiveness. The second chapter analyzes the rise and fall of the two of the most 
infamous TCOs, the Medellin cartel led by Pablo Escobar and the Cali cartel. This 
chapter analyzes both organizations against the aforementioned key internal and external 
factors at their peak power in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Then, it examines the 
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results of each indicator in relation to the groups’ demise following the forcible removal 
of their respective leaders to determine if the indicators had any measurable effect on 
effectiveness of leadership decapitation. The third chapter shifts focus to the FARC and 
explains how the political motivation of this group impacted the counter-strategy before 
analyzing it and then comparing it to its reality following its legitimation. This case study 
is unique, in that, the peace agreement negotiated the survival of this group as a 
legitimate political party. The fourth chapter applies these same principles to the Sinaloa 
cartel and attempts to explain its resiliency in the face of multiple leadership 
decapitations. The fifth chapter concludes by arguing that leadership decapitation 
strategies are only effective when applied within a greater strategy to counter TCOs. 







II. MEDELLIN AND CALI CARTELS: SETTING 
THE PRECEDENT FOR LEADERSHIP 
DECAPITATION SUCCESS 
The story of Colombia from the 1970s through the early 2000s was the story of 
narco-traffickers and their evolution into TCOs. Probably the most infamous were the 
Medellin and Cali Cartels: in 1988, former president Betancur stated with regard to the 
Medellin cartel that Colombia was “up against an organization stronger than the state.”42 
This statement could just as easily be about the threat posed by these two groups as a 
whole. The Medellin and Cali cartels became the first transnational narcotic organizations 
and controlled the majority of the world’s cocaine trade.43 Both of these groups 
undertook violent campaigns against any perceived opposition, which, in the 1980s, led 
to the deaths of “3,000 soldiers and police officers, more than 1,000 public officials, 170 
judicial employees, 50 lower judges, dozens of journalists, 12 Supreme Court judges, 
three presidential candidates, one attorney general, and one newspaper publisher.”44 This 
violence was by no means the only strategy employed by the Medellin and Cali cartels; 
they also engaged in a widespread campaign of extortion, bribery, and intimidation.45 
Generally, the Medellin cartel kept a higher profile and had a tendency toward violence, 
while the Cali cartel attempted to maintain a lower profile and tended to be more 
placating toward government authorities.46  
These tendencies impacted the method of leadership removal for each: Pablo 
Escobar and most of the top leadership of the Medellin cartel were killed, whereas three 
of the four leaders of the Cali cartel were arrested, the fourth was killed, and one of the 
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arrested was assassinated while in prison. Following these forced leadership changes, 
both organizations disintegrated; what remains of them is a mere shadow of their former 
selves. Due to the overwhelming effectiveness of leadership decapitation against these 
organizations, it became the default method of dealing with TCOs for the United States 
and many of its international partners, including Mexico and Colombia.47  
This chapter analyzes the Medellin and Cali cartels comparatively and then 
examines how their relationship with each other, along with other internal and external 
factors—institutionalization, popular support, history with rivals and allies, and law 
enforcement efforts—may have affected their vulnerability to leadership decapitation. 
The discussion begins with a brief overview of the Medellin and Cali cartels, their rise to 
power and period of dominance. Then it analyzes their theoretical vulnerability to 
leadership decapitation and whether those predictions align with the reality of their 
collapse. Ultimately, this chapter argues that the highly centralized structure of these 
organizations and the nature of the individuals at the top coupled with low levels of 
popular support created a critical vulnerability to leadership decapitation that was fully 
exploited by Colombian law enforcement efforts.  
A. THE MEDELLIN CARTEL AND PABLO ESCOBAR 
In the late 1980s, the Medellin cartel, led by Pablo Escobar, was one of the most 
lucrative businesses in the world and made Escobar the seventh richest man in the 
world.48 The term cartel is misleading, however, as this organization operated more like a 
collective than a price-setting cartel as defined in economics. Its organizational structure 
came about largely because of the group’s founding as Muerte a Secuestradores (“Death 
to Kidnappers,” or MAS) in 1982.49 MAS was an alliance of traffickers in the Medellin 
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region of Colombia that joined together in response to the kidnapping of a member of the 
Ochoa family, who were prominent traffickers and colleagues of Escobar, by M-19.50 
The alliance proved lucrative to its members, as they were able to share security 
resources and increase overall capital, and so it continued on even after they had dealt 
with M-19 and the threat of kidnapping had decreased.51 As the organization grew to 
encompass new business ventures and pooled resources to insure their shipments, it 
evolved beyond trafficking and self-protection to become the Medellin cartel, with 
branches dealing in all parts of the illicit economy as well as the legal system. The “Big 
Three,” Pablo Escobar Gaviria, Jorge Ochoa Vasquez, and Carlos Ledher Rivas, 
controlled all operations of the Medellin cartel and approved any new enterprises or 
changes within the alliance.52  
Despite having a clearly delineated hierarchical internal organization, the 
structure of the Medellin cartel was not readily apparent to outside sources, as was made 
apparent by the conflicting information on the Medellin hierarchy published in several 
contemporary magazines. In 1987, Pablo Escobar and Jorge Ochoa were featured in 
Forbes’ first “international billionaires” issue—the only two Colombians to make the 
list.53 Escobar owned 40 percent of the Medellin cartel by the late 1980s (the largest 
share held by one person), and Ochoa, with his brothers, owned 30%. By 1987, Forbes 
estimated Escobar to be worth over $2 billion, with the cartel netting more than $7 billion 
over the previous five years.54 However, another member of the Medellin cartel, Jose 
Rodriguez Gacha, made the cover of Fortune magazine in 1989 and was estimated to be 
worth $5 billion.55 
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These shifting numbers signaled observers’ confusion about the profitability of 
the drug market. Because profits from the illicit economy leave no record in the form of 
tax forms or other legal paperwork, most media companies like Forbes and Fortune 
magazine estimated the cash flow or monetary worth of suspected traffickers using 
indirect measures such as drug interdictions, public expenses, and the average price of 
cocaine on the street. These companies’ inability to agree on which trafficker had more 
net worth also highlights the overall lack of understanding most analysts struggled with 
on determining the hierarchal structure of the cartels.  
The confusion over the cartel’s structure and leadership was not merely limited to 
magazines. In 1989, once the United States decided to take more direct action against the 
Medellin cartel, the U.S. agents in Colombia would also misidentify the leaders, naming 
Gacha as the top man.56 Escobar was not revealed as the top leader until after Gacha’s 
death, when agents noticed there was no change in or disruption to the Medellin cartel’s 
operations but an increase in calls to Escobar from Gacha’s associates.57 The Big Three 
and their associates at the top of organization remained micromanagers in the 
organization until their eventual removal by law enforcement, at which point the 
organization fell into disarray and the Cali cartel moved in to fill the power vacuum for a 
short while before meeting a similar fate. 
B. THE CALI CARTEL AND THE RODRIGUEZ OREJUELA BROTHERS 
Whereas Escobar and the Medellin cartel gained significant notoriety from their 
violent actions, the Cali cartel preferred to keep violence in the realm of deniability, 
earning its leaders the nickname “the gentlemen from Cali.”58 These “gentlemen” were 
Gilberto Rodriguez Orejuela, Miguel Angel Rodriguez Orejuela, Jose Santa Cruz 
Londono, and Hélmer Herrera Buitrago. The brothers Gilberto and Miguel were bankers 
who operated in a higher class of society than their Medellin counterparts and owned a 
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soccer team and a large pharmacy chain.59 Their relationship with the Medellin cartel 
would evolve from suspicious peers in the U.S. drug market and occasional allies in the 
realm of Colombian politics to a bitter rivalry that continued until the Medellin cartel’s 
demise.60  
In keeping with their nickname, the leaders of the Cali cartel employed a large 
number of lawyers and preferred to fight their battles with the government in the 
courtroom rather than in the street.61 Although they engaged in their share of violence 
against potential rival groups, they shied away from direct involvement in matters that 
would openly humiliate the Colombian government or police.62 This lower-profile 
business model kept the “gentlemen of Cali” relatively safe from the measures being 
employed to catch Escobar. Therefore, at the end of the Medellin cartel’s regional 
dominance, the Cali cartels assets were not seized, there were no large rewards posted, 
and there was no manhunt for them.63 This oversight allowed the Cali cartel to take 
advantage of the Medellin cartel’s weakness by slowly expanding into Medellin’s 
territory before finally taking over as the dominant TCO in the world after the Medellin 
cartel’s collapse. This victory for the gentlemen of Cali would only last for a few short 
years, however, before their organization would fall to the same fate.64 
C. INDICATORS FOR LEADERSHIP DECAPITATION 
This section will analyze the Medellin and Cali cartels internal and external 
factors that were defined in Chapter I—institutionalization, popular support, history with 
rivals and allies, and law enforcement efforts—to determine if these factors may have  
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impacted the organizations’ vulnerability to leadership decapitation. A comparative 
approach will be used to discuss each organization’s similarities and differences for each 
factor and how that may have affected their respective responses to leadership 
decapitation. 
1. Institutionalization 
Both the Medellin and Cali cartels operated as highly centralized wheel networks, 
as depicted in Figure 1, which made them particularly vulnerable to leadership 
decapitation. The leaders, or core, controlled all aspects of the organization. Double-
headed arrows represent groups that operate at similar levels within the organization and 
are accountable to each other, while single-headed arrows represent a distinct chain of 
command, with the core leaders holding the others accountable.65 The amount of 
micromanagement varied from leader to leader: some gave objectives and allowed the 
subordinate to decide the  means while others gave subordinates detailed instructions 
with no room for deviation. Regardless of leadership style, the result was the same: both 
organizations were heavily dependent on their leadership to continue day-to-day 
operations.66 
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Figure 1. Wheel network for drug trafficking organizations.67 
While the organization type depicted in Figure 1 may look structured, with open 
communication between the different operations, this was only true at the higher levels of 
the organization. Lower down, each type of activity in Medellin and Cali, whether 
assassinations, bribery, narcotics production or distribution, or political messaging, had 
its own branch separate from the rest of the organization and reported up its own chain of 
command to the core.68 At the level of day-to-day operations, no one knew more than 
was necessary to complete their job, and only the leaders of the branch may have had the 
full picture of their segment of operations.   
While the high levels of centralization exhibited by both the Medellin and Cali 
cartels theoretically made them more susceptible to leadership decapitation, how 
vulnerable they were differed due to the different power distribution at the top of each 
organization. The Medellin cartel was led heavily by Pablo Escobar; most decisions and 
operations were made or run by his authority. Upon the loss of other leaders, his response 
was to consolidate their responsibilities into his own. An example of how this kind of 
centralization plays out in leadership decapitation is found in the Medellin cartel with the 
death of Gacha. Although he was near the top and ran his own trafficking networks 
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within the cartel, when he was gone, his responsibilities were taken over by Escobar, with 
barely any disturbance to operations.69 Once the Ochoa brothers and Ledher were out of 
the picture, however, Escobar’s paranoia spiked, and he further consolidated control and 
power to himself.70 This move further increased the vulnerability of the Medellin cartel to 
leadership decapitation, as there were no contingency plans if anything happened to 
Escobar.71 While this arrangement allowed Escobar a huge amount of control with regard 
to what the cartel was doing, when they were doing it, and to whom it was being done, it 
also made him a critical lynchpin in the system, thereby rendering the organization highly 
susceptible to leadership decapitation. 
Conversely, the Cali cartel spread power among its leaders, with each being 
responsible for different operations, which made it slightly less vulnerable to leadership 
decapitation by having less concentrated power and authority than the Medellin cartel. 
For example, Gilberto was responsible for the financial branch, including money 
laundering, which he accomplished through his position as Chairman of the Board of 
Banco de Trabajadores.72 The other cells of operation within the Cali cartel were narco-
trafficking, military, political, and legal.73 By splitting the responsibilities up among the 
leaders, the Cali cartel diffused the potential impact if one or two leaders were removed. 
If one or two leaders were eliminated, then operations may have been disrupted for a 
short time until a replacement was found or the responsibilities were redistributed. If all 
of the leaders were dispatched in a short time frame, then operations would likely be in 
disarray and result in a vacancy chain within the organization whereby upward mobility 
of personnel either fills the leadership positions or results in fragmentation due to 
disagreement over the successors. In reality, three of the Cali cartel’s four leaders were 
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arrested within three months with the fourth negotiating his surrender shortly thereafter 
and the Cali cartel’s multi-billion dollar business crumbled.74 
2. Popular Support 
The literature on leadership decapitation suggests that a group that enjoys 
widespread popular support will be more resilient following the removal of a leader. The 
massive popular support the Medellin and Cali cartels enjoyed in their respective bases 
may have provided enough protection to allow them to continue operations within those 
cities following leadership decapitation, but it was not enough to protect their holdings as 
transnational organizations. Their home bases provided a safe haven for the cartels to 
carry out operations with less fear of repercussions and also gave them a large 
recruitment pool. The loyalty Medellin and Cali instilled in these populations may have 
allowed enough stability post-decapitation for these organizations to rebound, but outside 
of their bases, it was a different story. The lack of support in the rest of the country 
greatly surpassed the slight protection the support of the home base provided; as a result, 
both organizations remained vulnerable to leadership decapitation.  
The main difference between the two organizations was their preferred methods 
for dealing with opposition, and this difference affected the amount of popular support 
they received. The Medellin cartel tended toward violence against any opposition. Within 
Medellin, Escobar was renowned as a saint-like figure, known to give money to the 
people when he was in town. However, outside his base, Escobar basically trademarked 
the threat of “plata o plomo” (silver or lead, referring to the choice between a bribe or 
death) when dealing with obstacles, which alienated the populace outside the cartel’s 
base and humiliated the Colombian government by showcasing its inability to provide 
security.75 The Cali cartel tended toward appeasement and bribery in political circles and 
utilized violence when they had plausible deniability or when dealing with other illicit 
organizations.76 This policy difference allowed them to cultivate allies and even fund a 
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successful election campaign in 1994, resulting in President Samper’s election. Cali’s 
attempt at controlling the presidential office ultimately backfired because the scandal that 
erupted when Cali’s involvement was revealed pressured Samper into being more 
aggressive in his approach to the Cali cartel and resulted in the arrests of the leaders and 
Cali’s eventual downfall.77 As a result of their failure to garner widespread popular 
support, neither group had enough popular support to stabilize their organization and 
enable their operations to continue after their respective decapitations.  
3. Rivalries and Alliances 
Another factor in determining an organization’s resiliency to leadership 
decapitation is their history of violent rivalry: the evidence from the case studies of the 
Medellin and Cali cartels in mixed. Relationships played an important role in determining 
the resiliency of the Medellin and Cali cartels to leadership decapitation, especially their 
tendency to shift from friendly associate to aggressive competitor with each other. 
Whether they were allies or rivals, their relationship refined the tactics, techniques, and 
procedures within both cartels but also exacerbated their tendency to concentrate power 
at the top. This tendency ultimately left both organizations more vulnerable to leadership 
decapitation.  
At the onset of their relationship, the cartels created an alliance based on a mutual 
political goal to end extradition to the United States. By the time this goal had been 
accomplished, the Cali cartel had outgrown its share of the U.S. drug market, and thus, its 
relationship with the Medellin cartel became one of violent economic competition.  
The Medellin cartel was in a position of power at the onset of its relationship with 
the Cali cartel and continued to operate from this position throughout the relationship. Its 
inability to recognize and address the changing power dynamics created a weakness 
within the organization. As the Colombian government increased its efforts in the hunt 
for Escobar, the Cali cartel funded an organization called Los PEPEs (The People 
Persecuted by Pablo Escobar) that brutally hunted down members and facilities of the 
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Medellin cartel.78 The Medellin cartel was now fighting a war on multiple fronts and 
Escobar was the only leader left and he did not trust anyone else to manage operations.79 
Between law enforcement, Los PEPEs, and Escobar’s growing paranoia the Medellin 
cartel’s vulnerability to leadership decapitation was growing as Escobar continued to 
consolidate operational authority for himself.80 
The Cali cartel constantly assessed the Medellin cartel for potential weaknesses 
that would signal Cali’s turn to rise to the top of the drug world and utilized lessons 
learned from its interactions with the Medellin cartel. Even the Cali cartel’s business 
savvy did not guarantee its survival: it weathered its violent rivalry with Medellin only to 
be toppled by law enforcement.81 Although studies have shown that groups that survive 
violent rivalries should be more resilient to leadership decapitation, the Cali case study 
implies that this is not always the case.82 The Cali cartel’s tendency to use proxies in its 
rivalry with the Medellin cartel make it difficult to ascertain the specifics of how that 
rivalry was conducted, but it is clear that the rivalry did not provide the added protection 
from leadership decapitation that the literature suggests.83 The lack of added protection 
could have been due to their rivalry with the Medellin cartel being conducted more by 
proxy, or it could have been due to the individual personalities of the leaders and their 
disinclination to disperse power into different levels of the organization.84 The literature 
suggests that a violent rivalry should draw the attention of the leaders to weaknesses in 
organization structure that need to be addressed. The Cali cartel case study suggests that 
either violent rivalries do not always result in solutions that fix deficiencies in the 
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organizational structure, or these interactions are dependent on individual personalities to 
address vulnerabilities. Therefore, it is likely the violent rivalry between the Medellin and 
Cali cartels simply did not provide enough resiliency to cover the vulnerability created by 
the organizational structure of either organization. 
4. Law Enforcement Efforts 
Protracted law enforcement efforts that involve multiple lines of effort tend to 
produce an organization that is more resilient to decapitation. If the goal is to decrease 
vulnerability, law enforcement efforts should draw an organization’s attention to its 
organizational vulnerabilities and then pressure the organization to take steps to address 
the vulnerability, much like the previous factor of violent rivalry. With this factor, the 
results for the case studies of the Medellin and Cali cartels are similar. Although the 
Medellin and Cali cartels survived the initial onset of violent rivalry with law 
enforcement, each organization eventually fragmented as a result of leadership 
decapitation efforts by law enforcement.85 The length of their struggle and, for the 
Medellin case, the Colombian government’s explicit goal of leadership decapitation 
should have signaled to both groups the need to take steps to reduce their vulnerability to 
this strategy. Instead, Escobar continued to consolidate power throughout his struggle 
against the Colombian government and law enforcement until his demise.86 Without his 
leadership, the Medellin cartel quickly crumbled, and the Cali cartel took over key 
market shares.87  
After the fall of the Medellin cartel, it should have been even more obvious to 
the Cali cartel that steps needed to be put in place to protect the business in the event of 
the leaders’ removal. Instead, the leaders maintained their grip on power, made no plans 
for succession, and, when law enforcement was closing in, negotiated their surrender.88 
They may have intended to continue running operations from prison, much as 
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Escobar did from La Catedral; if this was their plan, it was unsuccessful. Following 
its leaders’ incarceration, the Cali organization also fragmented and gave way to 
new organizations.89  
The Medellin and Cali cartel case studies both suggest that law enforcements’ 
blatant efforts at leadership decapitation may not always cause the TCO to respond in a 
predictable way—namely, taking precautions for the survival of the cartel. This finding 
also implies that it could be the organizational structure and type of leadership that 
determines this reaction: with power concentrated in a single figure or small group, an 
organization’s response to leadership decapitation is effectively determined by the 
leaders’ idiosyncratic response to the threat.  
D. CONCLUSION 
Due to their dependency on leaders for decision-making, a lack of popular support 
outside their bases, a breakdown in alliances, and multiple lines of effort by law 
enforcement, the Medellin and Cali cartels were both moderately to highly susceptible to 
a strategy of leadership decapitation. Pablo Escobar’s move to consolidate power and 
micromanage all aspects of the organization made his death the death knell for the 
Medellin cartel; the Cali cartel’s power-sharing among its leaders was not protection 
enough to shield their organization from forced leadership removal. In the cases of 
Medellin and Cali, the highly centralized structure of these TCOs kept them from taking 
steps to disperse power throughout the organization and, ultimately, left a fatal flaw that 
could not be protected against by other means.  
The fall of these organizations did not, however, mean an end to the problem of 
drug trafficking in Colombia. In fact, the fate of the Cali and Medellin cartels provides 
newer cartels with lessons on how to avoid a similar fate, and most seem to have 
established themselves accordingly. As Martin states: 
With the supplanting of the Cali and Medellin cartels, Colombian drug 
traffickers moderated their operational resistance to the government and  
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they have not resumed narco-terrorism to the same degree as the large 
cartels. This has brought a measure of stability from the perspective of 
Colombian transnational organized crime, because drugs continue to flood 
the illicit market and Colombian gangs continue to prosper from the 
demand for drugs in Europe and the United States.90 
The case studies of the Medellin and Cali cartels suggest both the promise and the 
limitations of a decapitation strategy. Although the two TCO’s are gone, the illicit 
economy they developed is still thriving under new leadership. Leadership decapitation 
was successful in both cases at dismantling the large TCOs, but it was unsuccessful at 
stopping the drug trade. 
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III. THE FARC AND COLOMBIA: 
A DECAPITATION SUCCESS 
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is an important case for 
this thesis because it represents a successful use of a decapitation strategy as a piece of a 
grander strategy. The FARC is an insurgency, not a traditional Transnational Criminal 
Organization (TCO)—it is the only insurgency covered in this thesis—but this case 
has important lessons for this thesis because it illuminates how the prevalent terrorist 
and insurgency studies could be generalizable to TCOs. As was discussed in the first 
chapter, the core motivation of the FARC is a political ideology rather than the profit 
motive that characterizes the other case studies. This difference is critical to acknowledge 
when compiling a counter-strategy for these organizations because a national government 
can leverage the political organization’s stated goals and objectives in peace negotiations. 
The government’s willingness to engage politically with an insurgency has implications 
for the effectiveness of counterinsurgency operations as well as for the insurgency’s 
social resources and recruitment bases—all of which has been true in the case of 
the FARC.  
The FARC conducted an insurgency campaign that lasted approximately 52 years, 
until officially ending its existence as an armed group in 2017 as part of a peace deal.91 
President Santos was awarded a Nobel Peace Prize for work in achieving this historic 
agreement.92 Since the peace agreement was signed, the Colombian economy has been 
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steadily growing.93 Colombia has marketed this economic success as well as the peace 
deal to improve their international image as a reliable partner.94  
To explain how Colombia successfully utilized leadership decapitation as an 
element of the government’s strategy to bring the FARC to the negotiating table, this 
chapter first gives a brief background on the rise of the FARC in Colombia. Then it 
examines the government’s changing counterinsurgency strategies under President 
Pastrana (1998–2002), President Uribe (2002–2010), and President Santos (2010–2018). 
This history establishes how leadership decapitation evolved within these strategies 
before becoming its own objective. It then discusses internal and external features of the 
FARC that bore on the eventual success of leadership decapitation and may help predict 
the effectiveness of this strategy in the future. Finally, it analyzes the role of leadership 
decapitation in bringing the FARC to the negotiating table as well as its impact on the 
FARC as an organization. 
A. THE RISE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF 
COLOMBIA (1948–1998) 
The FARC evolved over time from a political party to an armed insurgency 
fighting a self-proclaimed “people’s war” before eventually being labelled a Foreign 
Terrorist Organization by the United States.95 It is important to examine the roots of this 
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Colombian government and the implications for non-combatants. The origin of the FARC 
is found in the period of Colombian history from 1948–1958 known as La Violencia.96 
This conflict was a civil war that raged between Conservative and Liberal parties and 
resulted in between 200,000-400,000 casualties, or approximately four percent of the 
total population.97 The FARC gained experience and tactics in this conflict that they 
would use throughout their insurgency, and this level of violence set a standard that was 
later emulated by narco-traffickers and insurgent organizations throughout the country.98  
Following La Violencia, the Colombian Communist Party (PCC) resettled 
disgruntled members of their party into rural areas of the country; these pockets of 
support formed the foundation of support for the FARC. Manuel Marulanda and Jacobo 
Arenas, members of the PCC, founded the FARC as a political movement with the stated 
objective of pushing reforms that would allow for the election of a Leftist government.99 
The FARC’s proposed reforms and objectives included the possibility of using military 
force to overtake the Colombian government and force social reforms that addressed the 
country’s rampant inequality.100 By 1964, the FARC, as they are known today, expanded 
beyond their previous role as the armed wing of the PCC.101 To fund its underlying 
political goals and arm a rebellion, the FARC resorted to trafficking in narcotics, 
kidnapping for ransom, extortion, and hijackings.102  
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Concurrently with these domestic struggles, Colombia was developing as a 
prominent producer of both heroin and cocaine.103 Colombia’s prominence in the illicit 
drug market exacerbated its internal instability and made it a near-perfect environment 
for various insurgencies, including the FARC, to grow and gain power.104 
While the FARC was developing as an armed leftist organization, Colombia was 
earning its reputation as a narco-state from the 1970s through the 1990s. While Colombia 
had been violent previous to this period, especially throughout La Violencia, the 1990s 
saw an increasing amount of political assassination, corruption, and extortion by drug 
cartels, paramilitaries, and left-wing groups.105 The rising pattern of violence in 
Colombia is depicted in the Figure 2. Notably, violence rose from the late 1980s until the 
1990s and did not significantly ebb until 2003. A portion of this violence was carried out 
by paramilitary groups that were formed and supported by the wealthy landowners to 
protect them from the threat posed by the FARC.106 These groups had mostly joined 
together by 1990 and formed the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC).107 
Shortly after the AUC was formed, the United States government labelled it and the 
FARC as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) due to their pattern of involvement in 
drug trafficking, extortion, and kidnapping for ransom.108     
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Figure 2. Timeline juxtaposing key events with presidential 
terms and annual homicides in Colombia.109 
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B. COLOMBIA’S CHANGING COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGIES. 
Colombia’s counter-FARC strategies shifted from the 1980s until 2012. Initially, 
peace negotiations were favored by the Colombian government, but the FARC proved 
duplicitous and used these talks to gain more power and territory. Once the negotiations 
proved unsuccessful, the government pursued a number of military options. Eventually, 
in the early 2000s, the Colombian government would settle on a plan that favored the use 
of military force to achieve the end states of regaining territory and removing FARC 
leadership.  
1. Colombia’s Counterinsurgency Efforts (1980–1998) 
Colombia’s counter-FARC strategies developed from the unsuccessful peace 
negotiations in the 1990s to the use of military force to achieve the end states of regaining 
territory and removing FARC leadership in the early 2000s. The first attempts at peace 
negotiations between the FARC and the Colombian government occurred in the 1980s 
under President Belisario Bentancur.110 Under the auspice of these negotiations, the 
FARC formed a political party, the Patriotic Union, and ran for office. Their success in 
the voting polls was short-lived as the party was mostly wiped out by targeted 
assassinations by paramilitaries, Colombian security forces, and, to a lesser degree, rogue 
elements of the FARC.111 Following this setback, the FARC withdrew its diplomatic 
plans to refocus on military action.112 The federal government faced a similar setback in 
power and legitimacy following this election when the former DEA office chief in 
Colombia, Joe Toft, accused newly elected President Samper of taking money from the 
Cali cartel to fund his campaign and released tapes as proof to the media.113 These 
accusations led to a drawn-out impeachment process that ended only when President 
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Samper’s term in office concluded in 1998.114 The publicity surrounding these hearings 
damaged the government’s efforts to promote the legitimacy of its future counter-narcos 
and counter-insurgency campaigns to the public; as a result the Pastrana administration 
began its strategy already at a disadvantage in terms of popular support. 
2. The FARC under the Pastrana Administration (1998–2002) 
President Pastrana, in his attempts to counter the FARC throughout his 
presidency, largely focused on diplomatic and political solutions and ignored military 
solutions, which unintentionally gave the FARC space to grow in power. Throughout his 
time in office, President Pastrana attempted a succession of unsuccessful peace talks with 
the FARC and even negotiated a safe haven of approximately 42,000 square miles, in the 
municipality of La Uribe, in which the FARC  could operate in the interim and where the 
negotiations would take place.115 Instead of utilizing this safe haven in good faith and 
within the terms of the negotiations, however, the FARC used it as a place to regroup and 
rearm in relative safety.116  
This pattern of failure in peace negotiations caused a deterioration in popular 
and military support for President Pastrana.117 Pastrana’s neglect of military solutions 
deepened the schism between the government and military in the country’s strategic 
planning and made for a disjointed strategy for counterinsurgency. Every agency 
involved, whether civilian or military, developed its own set of objectives and 
courses of action; consequently, there was very little unity of effort under the 
Pastrana administration.118 
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The main exception to President Pastrana’s disregard for the military was his 
pursuit of aid from the United States in the form of Plan Colombia. This aid was 
negotiated between the Pastrana and Clinton administrations under the auspice of the 
United States’ War on Drugs.119 Pastrana wanted to utilize this aid to contain the FARC 
by tying it to narco activities. This correlation was not difficult to prove, as by the early 
2000s the FARC’s involvement in the drug trade had expanded to include all the steps 
from cultivation to production and even some distribution; analysts estimated the FARC 
controlled approximately 60 percent of cocaine leaving Colombia.120  
While the initial agreement provided a significant contribution of almost $1 
billion in aid in the first year, it was only partially successful: this aid was mostly military 
equipment, and all assistance was explicitly earmarked for counter-narcotics.121 This 
allocation made it mostly unavailable for counterinsurgency operations unless the targets 
could be tied to the drug trade. The arrangement made sense politically, as it catered to 
the interests of the United States in the region to garner a large amount of aid, but also 
illustrates how the lacking unity of effort between the administration and the military 
negatively impacted access to funding for non-drug related counter-insurgency 
operations.122 Due in part to these complications and a lack of attention and maybe even 
interest from the Pastrana administration, the military instituted a number of restructuring 
reforms to combat these narco-insurgencies on their own. Ultimately, President Pastrana 
did not recognize the power of a joint civil–military plan; as a result, his plan was riddled 
with inconsistencies and inefficiencies.123  
While Pastrana’s administration continued to pursue diplomatic solutions, it failed 
to pass new legislation to allow for increased intelligence collection efforts by law 
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enforcement or the military against the FARC.124 As the state continued to operate under 
peacetime legislation, the military adapted and instituted widespread reform that included 
better training, an increased corps of non-commissioned officers, more efficient processes 
to absorb and quickly implement lessons learned, and a reorganization into geographic 
divisions.125 The military pursued these reforms after suffering a number of defeats at the 
hands of the FARC. These reforms parallel many institutions and practices found in the 
United States military and could be credited to the counter-narcotics funding and training 
the military received from the United States under Plan Colombia.126 The Colombian 
military undertook these steps primarily due to  Major General (MG) Carlos Alberto 
Ospina Ovalle, Army Chief of Operations and Inspector General of Armed Forces, his 
commander, General Jorge Enrique Mora Rangel, Commander of the Colombian Army, 
and General Fernando Tapias Stahelin, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of 
Colombian Armed Forces.127 According to Thomas A. Marks, “[T]hese officers shared . . 
. a correct understanding of Colombia’s war and a well-developed approach to 
institutional transformation and operational art.”128 Nevertheless, despite these military 
reforms, the restraints of peacetime legislation blocked the military from engaging in 
intelligence collection efforts.129 While the unique opportunities made possible by these 
reforms could not be fully utilized under the Pastrana administration, these officers’ 
reforms set the military up to integrate neatly into President Uribe’s comprehensive 
strategy.130  
3. The FARC under the Uribe Administration (2002–2010) 
Alvaro Uribe promised during his campaign that he would make defeating 
guerrilla organizations, mainly the FARC, his top priority. This promise played on the 
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public sentiment that the government had not been trustworthy or effective in its past 
attempts at counterinsurgency.131 The fact that he was a political outsider, nationally, 
prior to his election in 2002 only strengthened his campaign. He was elected and took 
office in May 2002; shortly thereafter, he declared a state of emergency that allowed the 
military and law enforcement greater counterinsurgency authorities, while he pushed 
through new legislation and doctrine to support both institutions.132  
Uribe’s new “Democratic Security and Defense Policy” focused on increasing 
state capacity to enhance security under rule of law in the rural areas of the country.133 
This policy established primary objectives in its counter-insurgency efforts that lasted 
through the end of the conflict. These objectives were to end the armed conflict, increase 
state capacity, increase security under rule of law, and promote stability to develop into a 
South American regional power.134 To this end, President Uribe worked with the United 
States to restructure Plan Colombia in a way that allowed the resources to be used more 
effectively toward his goal through nation-building.135   
President Uribe further capitalized on the restructured military by switching to a 
predominantly volunteer force rather than draftees. This reform allowed him to utilize an 
old 1940s law that allowed volunteers to opt to serve in their hometowns, thereby 
preserving local knowledge and connections.136 The improved local forces significantly 
increased the quality and quantity of intelligence collection in both civil and military 
institutions by capitalizing on their knowledge of the local dialects. The new Joint 
Command then consolidated the gathered intelligence and disseminated it across the 
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entire civil-military enterprise.137 As the military utilized the local forces to hold territory 
and reestablish security under rule of law, they expanded out from this territory to push 
the FARC further into the mountains and conducted landmine removal operations as they 
went.138  
Ultimately, President Uribe recognized that a comprehensive plan required both 
armed action and a strong narrative to break the FARC down enough to be willing to 
negotiate on the state’s terms.139 The administration’s information operations strategy 
attacked the FARC’s narrative that they were waging a “people’s war” by focusing news 
coverage on the acts of terror they conducted, the number of civilian deaths they caused, 
their ties to the cartels and the drug trade, their continued use of kidnapping for ransom, 
and their propensity to use landmines around their territory.140 These information 
operations were so successful that the FARC began complaining that if even one civilian 
died as a result of their political actions, they would be unable to get recognition for the 
political statement.141 Instead, all focus would be on the FARC’s responsibility for 
civilian casualties. Arguably, the FARC had lost popular support due to its own actions 
prior to the implementation of President’s Uribe’s campaign, as will be discussed later. 
The success of this narrative continues to the present, as the populace recently (2018) 
voted against the initial peace deal and accused it of being too lenient.142  
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Plan Patriota defined the military’s course of action under Uribe’s policy and 
further organized the military and defined new phases of operations for dealing with the 
FARC. Its prioritization of the FARC aligned with the shifting post-9/11 priorities of the 
United States toward counter-terrorism; the shift also led the United States to authorize 
the use of counter-narcotics funding for counter-terrorism missions.143 Plan Patriota had 
two defined end states: regain control of territory and remove FARC leadership.144 The 
Colombian Army created a new special operations command to accomplish the mission 
of deposing key leaders within the FARC.145 The Colombian military’s proposed scheme 
of maneuver was to push the FARC out of its claimed territory through the use of force 
and utilize guerrilla tactics to infiltrate FARC strongholds and capture or kill the 
leaders.146 The shared objective of leadership decapitation in both in the national strategy 
and the operational plan highlighted the importance being placed on it by both the 
administration and the military. The United States provided key support throughout this 
process by filling capability gaps, sharing intelligence, and providing training and 
expertise.147 With every military and narrative success, President Uribe won more 
popular support away from the FARC. 
Simultaneous to these operations, President Uribe was advocating for an 
amendment to the constitution that would allow him to run for reelection. President 
Uribe’s ambition exacerbated the already substantial pressure on his administration, 
domestically and internationally, to show metrics of success for his counterinsurgency 
and counter-narcotics campaigns.148 These metrics were dissatisfactory because the 
counter-narcotics estimates that the United States needed to legitimize the amounts of aid 
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it was sending only showed a small piece of the whole problem.149 Conversely, 
operations that had a tremendous impact on the FARC and their ability to operate did not 
necessarily have a counter-narcotics impact. When Uribe began his re-election campaign, 
the political opposition used some of the counter-narcotics metrics to show that his 
counterinsurgency strategy was flawed; however, this publicity almost backfired by 
giving the FARC a chance for strategic reversal by restoring some power over the 
narrative.150  
Still, by the end of Uribe’s second term in office, in 2010, his military and 
narrative strategy had forced the FARC deep into the periphery, significantly impacted 
their supply chains, and limited them to small-scale politically motivated attacks.151 
Despite the many successes of Uribe’s grand strategy, it was not without scandal and 
there were still many casualties suffered by both sides and civilians. Today, his counter-
insurgency legacy is tainted by allegations of support for right-wing paramilitary death 
squads, witness tampering, and extortion within his Congress.152 
4. The FARC under the Santos Administration (2010–2018) 
President Santos continued utilizing Uribe’s official national strategy, of which 
leadership decapitation was a piece, throughout his first term in office (2010–2014). This 
continuity in strategy and policy allowed for more advanced intelligence collection, 
planning, and eventually the leadership decapitation of two consecutive FARC leaders, 
Mono Jojoy and Alfonso Cano. During his second term in office, Santos actively pursued 
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peace negotiations that began with a one-month unilateral ceasefire by the FARC before 
becoming a bilateral ceasefire that eventually led to disarmament.153 While President 
Santos was awarded the 2016 Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts in creating a peace deal 
that both sides agreed upon, the deal was rejected when it was put to a national 
referendum.154 President Santos’ ratings dropped significantly, he was accused of being 
too lenient and the media indicated that the public had a strong desire to see members of 
the FARC punished for their crimes.155 His administration worked out a revised peace 
deal with the FARC that included an agreement by both sides to pay reparations to 
victims of the conflict, established a court that would try crimes of the conflict, and 
guaranteed the FARC ten seats in Congress.156 The punishments, however, would only be 
symbolic and carry no significant consequences.157 The public decried the symbolic 
punishments as once again too lenient, but President Santos defended these terms by 
stating that they were non-negotiable for the FARC’s agreement.158  
The Colombian Congress passed the revised peace agreement in 2016 without a 
referendum, and the people’s discontent over the terms was reflected in the 2018 
presidential and senate elections. Although the FARC was guaranteed ten seats in 
Congress, their leaders were hopeful that the election results would give those seats 
legitimacy.159 The opposite held true, and they received very few votes. Moreover, in the 
presidential election, Ivan Duque was elected on a platform that condemned the peace 
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plan as it was passed and promised change.160 As of 2018, the peace deal appeared on 
unsteady ground, and the affected parties are awaiting President Duque’s official policy 
for any potential changes.161  
Despite the uncertainty surrounding the deal following the failed referendum and 
then President Duque’s election, the FARC has disarmed according to the stipulated 
timetable.162 Probably directly linked to the FARC’s disarmament is a corresponding 
spike in coca cultivation and related violence being reported in previously FARC-
controlled land.163 It seems likely that other armed groups have begun vying for control 
over these lands in the FARC’s absence. These circumstances lend further credibility to 
the argument that Colombia’s problems are complex, and one solution or peace deal will 
not solve them all. To further complicate matters, some segments of the FARC have 
refused to disarm or acknowledge the legitimacy of the peace deal. These fragments are 
continuing operations, such as the kidnapping and murder of Ecuadorian reporters earlier 
this year.164 
                                                 
160 Former president Uribe was another public critic of the peace deal and a vocal support of Duque’s 
bid for the presidency. Uribe’s support likely bolstered Duque’s presidential campaign. Helen Murphy and 
Steven Grattan, “Colombia President-elect Vows to Unite Nation, Alter Peace Deal,” Reuters, last modified 
June 16, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-colombia-election/colombia-president-elect-vows-to-
unite-nation-alter-peace-deal-idUSKBN1JD03R; William Worley, “Colombian Election: Ivan Duque Vows 
to ‘Correct’ Peace Accord After Comfortable Win,” Telegraph, last modified June 18, 2018, 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/06/18/ivan-duque-winscolombian-election-promise-reform-peace-
accord/.  
161 Murphy and Grattan, “Colombia President-elect Vows to Unite Nation, Alter Peace Deal”; Worley, 
“Colombian Election.” 
162 “Colombia’s FARC Concludes Weapons Disarmament,” BBC, last modified August 16, 2017, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-40944329; Nicolas Casey and Joe Parkin Daniels, 
“‘Goodbye, Weapons!’ FARC Disarmament in Colombia Signals New Era,” New York Times, last 
modified June 27, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/27/world/americas/colombia-farc-rebels-
disarmament.html.  
163 The Data Team, “Opium and Cocaine Production Has Reached Record Levels,” The Economist, last 
modified June 28, 2018, https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2018/06/28/opium-and-cocaine-
production-has-reached-record-levels. 
164 Alexandra Valencia, “Ecuadorean Journalists Held by Colombian Rebels Confirmed Dead,” 
Reuters, last modified April 13, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ecuador-colombia-
kidnapping/ecuadorean-journalists-held-by-colombian-rebels-confirmed-dead-idUSKBN1HK2L0; 
“Ecuadorian Hostages Held by President’s Colombian Rebels Plead for President’s Help,” The Guardian, 
last modified April 17, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/17/ecuador-hostages-colombia-
kidnapping-farc-rebels-new-video.  
44 
C. THE ROLE OF DECAPITATION IN DEFEATING THE FARC 
The FARC survived various counter-insurgency strategies throughout its 50 plus 
year lifespan before finally agreeing to a genuine peace deal in 2011. This deal was tied 
to the success of President Uribe’s strategy to build state power in the periphery while 
utilizing the military to retake territory controlled by the FARC and—important for this 
thesis—to capture or kill their leadership as previously discussed. Uribe’s blended 
strategy of military actions and information operations caused widespread disruption 
within the FARC and dealt a critical blow to its popular support even before the deaths of 
three of the five founding members of the Secretariat, including the Commander-in-Chief 
Manuel Marulanda. This section tests the hypothesis that the success of leadership 
decapitation is dependent on the organization’s institutionalization, popular support, its 
history of alliances and violent rivalries, and its reactions to law enforcement efforts.165 
1. Institutionalization 
The first factor identified in the literature as associated with a successful 
decapitation campaign is that the organization is highly structured and institutionalized. 
Such an organization scheme is seen as allowing the organization to survive the killing of 
one of its leaders. The FARC did codify a highly structured and hierarchical chain of 
command that should have provided protection against leadership decapitation. The 
FARC’s bureaucracy distributes command by utilizing regional and functional blocs 
similar to the United States Department of Defense’s Combatant and Functional 
Commands.166 The FARC is controlled by a Central High Command composed of a 
commander-in-chief, a seven-member Secretariat, and the Estado Mayor Central (EMC), 
also known as the General Staff. This grouping is outlined in red in Figure 3. The Central 
High Command is led by the commander-in-chief, and this person determines 
overarching strategic guidance and policy, with the Secretariat and EMC playing an 
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advisory role. Theoretically, the Secretariat reports to the EMC; in practice, the opposite 
is true: the Secretariat guides the EMC, and the EMC is divided into groups that problem-
solve the Secretariat’s concerns.167  
 
Figure 3. FARC chain of command 
The separation of responsibilities into regional blocks with a delineated chain of 
command gives the FARC a codified protection against leadership turnover. Losing one 
or two leaders in a short time should be easily overcome within the structure of the 
organization. Below the Central High Command and subordinate to the Secretariat are 
the five regional blocs and two functional blocs: Eastern, Southern, Northwestern, 
Caribbean, Middle Magdalena, Joint Central Command, and Joint Western Command.168 
Each bloc is theoretically led by a member of the Secretariat and has similar 
political/military goals decided by the Central High Command, but no overlapping 
territory.169 In practice, some members of the Secretariat may control more than one bloc. 
For example, Jorge Briceno Suarez, aka Mono Jojoy, controlled the Eastern Bloc but also 
gave guidance to the Southern Bloc.170 Each geographical bloc consists of at least five 
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fronts that can have anywhere from a few dozen to a few hundred fighters.171 The joint 
commands have fewer fronts attached to them because they consist of areas where the 
FARC are relatively weak.172 The joint commands and the blocs also have mobile 
companies under their purview that are not permanently tied to a geographic area.173  
While the Central High Command operates at the strategic level of war, the joint 
commands and bloc are responsible for the operational level of war, as well as for 
providing tactical-level guidance for their subordinates in the fronts and companies.174 In 
practice, the Central High Command would decide the types and number of attacks or 
desired objective to be undertaken by each joint command or bloc. The leaders of each 
respective bloc or joint command would then consult with the leaders of their fronts to 
decide on a timeline and specific targets using the FARC’s target-selection criteria. The 
individual fronts would then carry out the decided-upon operations and related planning 
under their own leadership.175 If the operation fell outside of normal operating procedures 
or was not confined within a single bloc, the Central High Command would create a 
specific task force, usually named after a martyr, to carry out the desired objective.176 
Because the FARC has traditionally held land, it also, in theory, performs state-like 
functions; however, in practice, it is plagued by a chronic deficiency its ability to carry 
out these functions.177 Within their purview as a military organization, however, the 
FARC’s structure and clear delineation of responsibility gives them some protection 
against leadership decapitation. 
In conclusion, the structure of the FARC as an institution is well-defined and 
operationally decentralized, so it should, in theory, easily overcome leadership change. 
While the original leader, Marulanda, was instrumental in establishing the ideological 
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makeup of the organization as it developed, his tendency to rely on the Secretariat and 
EMC for operational guidance led to consistently decentralized operations. Furthermore, 
the clear chain of command with at least seven people involved in deciding on 
strategy gives the organization a cushion to accommodate for the loss of a few leaders. 
Based on these observations, the FARC does not seem to be a likely candidate for 
dissolution by leadership decapitation unless there was a significant disruption to their 
operational capacity. 
2. Popular Support 
The literature suggests that an organization that possesses popular support should 
be more resilient to leadership decapitation operations; however, the FARC’s tactics 
weakened their popular support and it did not benefit from the advantages popular 
support could have provided such as a greater recruitment base, greater access to 
resources, and an extended safe haven for operations.178 Although the FARC consistently 
portrays itself as a people’s movement, it undermined this image through its involvement 
in narcotics, imposition of “taxes” on civilians, and its increasingly violent operations. 
While the first two of these operations provided funding for the organization to expand its 
reach and political goals, they have also created a culture that alienates public support. 
Indeed, briefly, in the 1990s, the term “narco-guerrilla” surpassed “communist” as an 
identifier of one of the biggest enemies of the free world.179 (This sentiment was quickly 
overtaken by the notion of the “terrorist” in the aftermath of 9/11.) The tactics employed 
by guerilla groups, including the FARC, relied heavily on fear and targets of opportunity. 
Additionally, the FARC were never casualty-averse in their attacks.  
According to a study by Restrepo and Spagat, the primary lethal attacks carried 
out by Colombian guerrilla groups were indiscriminate bombings that typically included 
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a high civilian casualty ratio.180 These types of attacks, coupled with the high civilian 
casualties, provided a strong counter-narrative to the FARC’s insistence that it carries out 
a people’s war. Additionally, this data provided President Uribe with compelling 
evidence to use against the FARC in the court of public opinion as previously discussed.  
Beginning in the 1980s, the FARC increased its “taxation” policies, to include the 
narcotics trade, to further expand its reach.181 This shift was accompanied by a 
simultaneous shift in strategy from guerrilla warfare to more conventional warfare and 
controlling territory.182 The new taxation—gramaje—was a charge per gram of coca 
paste. First, the FARC applied taxes to the middle managers and traffickers, but 
eventually taxed the peasant farmers as well. Finally, the FARC began offering its 
services to trafficking organizations as a protection service and expanded their operations 
to include some coca processing by the 1990s.183 By 2000, the FARC passed new laws to 
codify new operational strategies, such as expropriating land, taxing U.S. assets, 
kidnapping for ransom, and taking and holding prisoners of war.184 As previously 
discussed, these actions ultimately contributed to the erosion of public support for the 
FARC. 
The FARC remained more of a guerrilla group than a narcotics organization from 
its conception until the early 2000s.185 Despite its minor involvement in the overall 
narcotics economy, which is massive in scope and value, the Colombian government 
estimated the FARC received approximately $783 million in 2003 in cocaine profits 
alone and approximately 50% of its annual revenue comes directly from its involvement 
with narcotics.186 Overall, as the FARC expanded its involvement in the illicit economy, 
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it lost its legitimacy as a people’s movement and eventually lost popular support. The 
lack of popular support made the FARC less resilient to leadership decapitation 
operations. 
3. Rivalries and Alliances 
The literature suggests that an organization’s ability to build alliances and outlast 
rivalries results in it taking steps that decrease its vulnerability to leadership decapitation. 
The FARC case study illustrates some of these advantages during its 50+ year tenure as 
an insurgency. It gained experience through building alliances and surviving rivalries; 
both types of relationship provided useful survival tactics, techniques, and procedures 
that the FARC would internalize throughout their lifespan as an insurgency. This section 
will discuss some of the significant alliances and rivalries that shaped the FARC, but is 
not to be taken as a comprehensive list.  
The majority of the FARC’s rivalries were a type of inter-field rivalry; a violent 
rivalry with groups that had disparate views from the FARC that resulted in kinetic 
actions being taken. The inter-field rivalries include altercations with the Cali and 
Medellin cartels as discussed in Chapter II, as well as with the paramilitaries (AUC); 
intra-field rivalries were also common with groups such as the National Liberation Army 
(ELN). These rivalries pushed the FARC to develop new counter-strategies and dispersal 
tactics. One of the most prevalent of these tactics was the laying of mine fields to protect 
their key territory. While this did have the desired effect of deterring rivals from pursuit, 
this tactic also had a negative impact on popular support and their projected image as a 
people’s army as previously discussed. 
The FARC’s vast system of alliances exemplifies the danger of a terrorist-
criminal nexus. Their allies spanned the globe to include support from Chavez in 
Venezuela which led to ties with Hezbollah and al Qaeda operations in Africa and with 
the ETA, IRA, and Russian Mafia in Europe.187 These alliances opened a global illicit 
economy to the FARC and broadened their resources for potential training and assistance 
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from more experienced groups in bomb making and political attacks. This complex 
alliance system provided the support necessary for the FARC to grow from a domestic 
insurgency to a transnational criminal organization. According to Hesterman, “FARC’s 
illegal activities net $500 to $600 million annually, one-half from drug cultivation and 
trafficking, with the remainder coming from kidnapping, extortion, and other criminal 
activities. Fifty percent of the world’s cocaine comes from Colombia.”188   
The FARC created a complex alliance system of both intra-field (other leftists) 
and inter-field (narco-trafficking) organizations. Their ties to organizations such as the 
Russian mafia for arms trafficking, the IRA for weapons and tactics training, Norte Valle 
cartel and other Mexican cartels for drug trafficking, and Peru for assault rifles made it 
difficult for them to portray their desired image as a legitimate political organization.189 
Despite the negative associations tied to these alliances, they provided the training and 
resources necessary for the FARC to continue their operations and combat their rivals, 
particularly the paramilitaries and the cartels. It helped the FARC’s survivability that the 
organizations they were allied with had also survived various rivalries and government 
attempts to dissolve them. It is highly probable that they shared lessons learned and 
training among these alliances much like their counterparts in the national military would 
do with their partners. 
The line between rivals and allies is thin and in near constant flux with all of the 
case studies covered in this thesis. For the FARC specifically, they were more often allies 
of similar leftist organizations outside of Colombia and rivals of the cartels, and this 
consistency sets them apart from the other cases studies. Surviving these rivalries 
strengthened their organization and provided experience that was later used to overcome 
law enforcement efforts. This finding coincides with research done by Friman and 
Phillips on terrorist organizations that groups selectively use violence as a market 
regulator and are less likely to do so against groups with a similar ideology.190 The 
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FARC’s survival of numerous rivalries and its strategic use of alliances allowed it to 
strengthen its organizational structure and define some lines of succession. Ultimately, 
these gains should have allowed the FARC to be more resilient against leadership 
decapitation. 
4. Law Enforcement Efforts 
As the literature discusses, concentrated and long-term law enforcement efforts 
should provide the same advantages to an organization as the allies and violent rivalries 
previously discussed. Section B details the changing law enforcement efforts of the 
Colombian government to counter the FARC. Previous to the Uribe administration, the 
Colombian police forces were prone to corruption and easily manipulated by the various 
cartels and insurgent groups in their respective regions.191 This coupled with the 
negotiated safe haven from the Pastrana administration allowed the FARC to operate with 
impunity in its various strongholds within that safe haven. As previously discussed, the 
military reforms that began under the Pastrana administration began to strip away that 
impunity and set up a system that could effectively enact counter-insurgency operations. 
Plan Patriota, begun in 2004, was the main effort by the Colombian military to disrupt 
and defeat the FARC. Since its implementation, all of the original members of the Central 
High Command are deceased or incarcerated. Additionally, there have been two 
turnovers at the position of commander-in-chief. Because the military played a large part 
in law enforcement efforts to counter the FARC, they are included in those efforts for the 
discussion in this section.192 This section discusses the significant efforts made by law 
enforcement and hypothesizes as to why Plan Patriota required so many years before 
succeeding in forcing the FARC into peace negotiations. Although there have been 
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allegations of human rights violations resulting from these operations, this section will 
not discuss those or their implications.193  
As discussed in the counter-insurgency section, Plan Patriota had two desired end 
states: reclaim FARC-controlled territory for the state and capture/ kill FARC leadership. 
While in the previous case studies, the law enforcement efforts through the Search Bloc 
forced quick adaptations to standard operating procedures in the cartels, the law 
enforcement efforts against the FARC were not robust until Plan Patriota. Due to law 
enforcement efforts being focused on the Medellin and Cali cartels previous to this 
strategy, Plan Patriota experienced initial success in countering the FARC. This 
advantage did not last long, as the FARC’s experience with violent rivalries had 
strengthened its overall organization and acclimatized it to rapid changes. However, these 
efforts did keep the FARC from gaining any competitive edge from their experience with 
law enforcement and eventually limited its adaptability. The FARC’s inability to continue 
adapting to law enforcement efforts left a vulnerability in the organization for leadership 
decapitation to be effective. This vulnerability was fully exploited through Plan Patriota 
operations and led to the deaths and arrests of not only leaders within the Secretariat, but 
also leaders of their regional blocs. These capture/ kill successes for law enforcement 
exacerbated the disruption caused by the reclamation of territory that, in turn, forced 
them into genuine peace talks in 2011. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Forced leadership change at the commander-in-chief position would not have 
critically damaged the FARC by itself, but when coupled with other destabilizing actions 
it resulted in instability and uncertainty that critically undermined the organization’s 
ability to effectively continue operations. Other major disruptions in operations, such as 
the removal of the regional bloc commanders and policy makers, increased the FARC’s 
need for strong and consistent leadership. Utilizing a counterinsurgency strategy that 
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forced instability throughout all levels of the organization while working to remove key 
leadership, damaged the FARC enough to convince the organization to join in peace 
negotiations. The FARC was ultimately susceptible to leadership decapitation as carried 
out through Plan Patriota because the high levels of institutionalization did not provide 
enough protection to cover the vulnerabilities from the other factors. This case study 
suggests that while the advantages of a highly institutionalized organization may provide 
some protection from leadership decapitation, the successive decapitation of multiple 
leaders can eventually overcome this protection. However, the FARC’s method of 
surrender through peace negotiations may not be as generalizable to TCOs due to its basis 





THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
55 
IV. THE SINALOA FEDERATION: 
THE RESTRICTIONS OF LEADERSHIP DECAPITATION 
AS A MODERN STRATEGY 
The final case study examines a more recent application of leadership 
decapitation against the Sinaloa cartel to determine whether the same factors—
institutionalization, popular support, history with rivals and allies, and law enforcement 
efforts—impact the organizational resiliency to this strategy. Mexico has a long and 
complex relationship with narco-traffickers, originating in the 1940s.194 The Mexican 
government under the control of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) practiced a 
policy of accommodation that allowed these narco-organizations to entrench themselves 
in society.195 During its 71-year rule, the PRI accepted bribes and allowed these 
organizations to operate and expand with almost no repercussions from law enforcement 
or other government agencies. In 2000, however, the PRI was voted out of office in favor 
of Vincente Fox, a candidate from the National Action Party (PAN).196 This party change 
complicated the relationship between government officials and organized crime: officials 
could no longer guarantee that an illicit organization would be able to operate freely in 
their region of responsibility.197 President Calderon of the National Action Party party, 
who succeeded Fox, entered office in 2006 and escalated this policy, beginning an 
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aggressive campaign against narco-organizations, with support and backing from the 
United States, that increased tensions and had only limited results.198  
During this time, there were four major drug trafficking organizations—the 
Tijuana/Arellano Felix organization (AFO), the Sinaloa cartel, the Juárez/Vicente Carillo 
Fuentes organization (CFO), and the Gulf cartel—and Calderon’s strategy had minimal 
impact on the Sinaloa cartel compared to the others.199 This gap in the strategy allowed 
the Sinaloa cartel to expand and led to allegations of corruption within the government, 
namely that the Sinaloa cartel was enjoying a privileged relationship that shielded them 
from these efforts.200 By 2010, the four organizations had expanded to seven major drug 
trafficking organizations—Sinaloa, Los Zetas, Tijuana/AFO, Juárez/CFO, Beltrán Leyva, 
Gulf, and La Familia Michoacana—although some estimates include up to 20 major 
organizations and countless small organizations.201 A possible factor for the rise of these 
organizations is the break-up of the Colombian cartels, discussed in Chapter II. As the 
Colombian groups crumbled and lost their hold on trafficking routes, Mexican trafficking 
organizations, including the Sinaloa cartel, collected those market shares and expanded 
their trafficking networks.202 These groups were especially competitive after the demise 
of the Colombian groups because of their expertise in trafficking, connections with the 
producers, and proximity to the United States.  
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This chapter examines the Sinaloa cartel (sometimes referred to as the Sinaloa 
Federation), which appears to have resisted Mexican government efforts against it, 
including the use of a decapitation strategy.203  It reviews how the cartel’s internal and 
external factors—institutionalization, popular support, history with rivals and allies, and 
law enforcement efforts—may have protected it from leadership decapitation. This 
assessment begins with a brief background on the Sinaloa cartel, its rise to power, and 
dominance in the region in which it operates. Then it analyzes the Sinaloa cartel’s 
hypothetical vulnerability to leadership decapitation against the reality of its resiliency to 
this strategy. To conclude, this chapter argues that the Sinaloa cartel demonstrates how 
modern organizations can develop protection against leadership decapitation. 
A. THE SINALOA CARTEL AND JOAQUIN “EL CHAPO” GUZMAN 
LOERA 
In 1989, the Mexican federal police arrested the leader of the Gulf cartel, Miguel 
Angel Felix Gallardo, and a young lieutenant, Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman Loera, saw 
his chance to break away and utilize his expertise in his own organization.204 He quickly 
established the Sinaloa cartel and began developing its interests within the cocaine supply 
chain from Colombia and distribution network in the United States.205 After the fall of 
the Medellin and Cali cartels, the market further opened up, and Sinaloa expanded its 
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interests to cocaine production and overseas markets.206 It has since grown in scope and 
size to be one of the largest and most well-established transnational criminal 
organizations.207 The Sinaloa cartel has a larger international footprint than other 
Mexican DTOs, with annual profits estimated at $3 billion.208  
It is likely that, when Guzman built the Sinaloa cartel, he incorporated lessons 
learned from observing the fall of the Medellin and Cali cartels, as well as from the 
demise of his employer’s cartel.209 Some of these lessons were implemented in familiar 
ways, such as a tendency to avoid violence with the government and a heavy reliance on 
bribes and extortion, while others are more discreet, such as the highly decentralized 
structure of the Sinaloa cartel and the leaders’ decision to avoid flashy purchases and 
lifestyles.210 The lower profile of the leaders of the Sinaloa cartel makes them harder to 
track and apprehend, the leaders’ familiarity and support within the Sinaloa region 
creates a type of safe haven, and the cartel’s organizational decentralization increases the 
organization’s resiliency to leadership decapitation.  
B. INDICATORS FOR LEADERSHIP DECAPITATION 
The Sinaloa cartel has survived the loss of leaders multiple times, perhaps most 
notoriously with the arrests and subsequent escapes of Guzman prior to his extradition to 
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the United States.211 This analysis examines the Sinaloa cartel’s internal and external 
factors as they were defined in Chapter 1—institutionalization, popular support, history 
with rivals and allies, and law enforcement efforts—to determine if these factors may 
have impacted the organizations’ vulnerability to leadership decapitation. Unlike the 
previous case studies, this organization is still operating as a TCO and it is likely that 
more detailed information about its inner workings may be released to the public or 
analyzed following Guzman’s trial or if/when the organization is defeated than is 
available at this time.   
1. Institutionalization 
The Sinaloa cartel is highly decentralized, with an alliance-based chain network 
that compartmentalizes operations; this structure provides significant protection from 
leadership decapitation strategies. Authority and responsibility are spread horizontally 
throughout the organization, so maintaining daily operations requires very little input 
from top leaders.212 Guzman and other top leaders have adopted low profiles and 
delegated their authority to lieutenants for most day-to-day activities. These leaders also 
implement strict operational security by limiting their electronic footprint and limiting 
new associations.213 Figure 4 depicts how this structure would look for the organization 
as a whole. A different small group or network would be contracted to have operational 
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multiple cells.214 This chain structure makes it easier for the Sinaloa cartel to replace 
pieces when they break off or become less efficient. These cells are apportioned out to 
different leaders for accountability and coordination as depicted in Figure 5. Then, these 
leaders are held accountable to each other for their piece of the cartel’s operations.215  
Double-headed arrows represent groups that operate at similar levels within the 
organization and are accountable to each other, while single-headed arrows represent a 
distinct chain of command, with the core leaders holding the others accountable.216 
Dotted lines represent groups that are may or may not be present in the structure and 
could be either leader or mission dependent.217 That said, the leaders represented in 
Figure 5 are not necessarily top leaders within the cartel, and there could be an additional 
component at the top representing a reporting requirement from these leaders to Guzman 
and his colleagues. This additional level of reporting is caused by the Sinaloa cartel’s 
tendency to contract out specialty work (software management, accounting, violent 
enforcement) to other organizations.218 The contracts, in turn, offered increased 
protection from leadership decapitation since they are fully operational on their own. 
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Figure 4. Chain network for modern drug trafficking organizations.219 
 
Figure 5. Cellular structure for modern drug trafficking organizations.220 
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The three arrests of Guzman, in 1993, 2014, and 2016, and the lack of measurable 
response in the Sinaloa cartel’s operations suggests that his role may not be a critical 
weakness of the organization and adds some degree of certainty to the previously 
discussed structure. Mexican TCOs, including the Sinaloa cartel, were named in the 
DEA’s National Drug Threat Assessment for the past few years as prominent traffickers 
in the United States even after Guzman’s extradition.221 The Sinaloa cartel’s continued 
dominance of the drug trade while Guzman was being actively pursued by Mexican 
authorities and after his extradition may also suggest that he may have handed over his 
role to a successor prior to these events. In either case, the Sinaloa cartel gained 
additional protection from leadership decapitation through its decentralized cellular 
organizational structure. 
The Sinaloa cartel’s institutional structure thus provides a large amount of 
protection from leadership decapitation. While Guzman may have been instrumental in 
organizing the initial organization and building partnerships, he is less likely to be a 
vulnerability to the organization’s ability to conduct operations. This lack of dependency 
is further evidenced by the group’s continued lifespan and proliferation past Guzman’s 
arrest and extradition in 2016.222 Due to these institutional conditions, it is unlikely that 
further leadership decapitation would have a lasting impact on the Sinaloa cartel. 
2. Popular Support 
Mexican cartels, such as the Sinaloa cartel, clearly recognize the benefits of 
popular support, with its implications for protection from leadership decapitation efforts 
and protection for the organization post-decapitation. Courting popular support by 
handing out donations is so prevalent in Mexico that it even has a name, narcolimonas, or 
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drug alms.223 According to Wainwright, cartels conduct marketing campaigns to 
influence two audiences: the public and the government.224 The Sinaloa cartel is 
especially savvy at messaging campaigns and has a history of framing other organizations 
for violent actions while promoting their violence as acts for the good of Mexico; these 
actions are likely to make it less vulnerable to leadership decapitation.225 
In 2014, when Guzman was arrested for the first time, it became apparent that he 
enjoyed widespread popular support. A nationwide poll showed that only 53 percent of 
the country agreed with his arrest, while 28 percent were actively against it.226 The day 
after his arrest, people flooded the streets of his home state, waving banners and wearing 
shirts that proclaimed their support for Guzman. While it is hard to calculate how much 
of this support was forced by members of the Sinaloa cartel, given the survey responses 
and its likely credibility, it is clear that he enjoyed some level of support throughout the 
country. While the level of certainty is unclear, in this example it seems plausible that 
popular support had a stabilizing effect on the Sinaloa cartel that provides added 
protection against leadership decapitation relative to the other case studies. 
3. Rivalries and Alliances 
A history of violent rivalry and various alliances have provided the Sinaloa cartel 
with another level of protection against leadership decapitation by revealing 
vulnerabilities within the organization, which it then addressed, thereby making it even 
less vulnerable to leadership decapitation. The Sinaloa cartel’s primary competitor for 
territory and market shares is Los Zetas, with other rivalries including the AFO and 
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CFO.227 The Sinaloa cartel gained numerous advantages by surviving its rivalries and 
internalizing tactics, techniques, and procedures that allowed operations to run as 
smoothly as possible during hostilities. Additionally, its domestic and international 
alliances afforded it protection from leadership decapitation by providing operational 
stability. 
The Sinaloa cartel’s rivalries were generally over territory or market shares in the 
illicit economy. Typically, its rivals would be of a similar background, with similar 
operational tendencies. For example, with the decline of Los Zetas due to an aggressive 
campaign by the Mexican government and a separate violent campaign by the Sinaloa 
cartel, the Sinaloa cartel’s newest rivals are the Cartel Jalisco-New Generation, split from 
the Sinaloa cartel and rose in the narcotics economy over the last five years.228 The 
Sinaloa cartel and its rivals were playing from the same rulebook and, therefore, needed 
to adapt quickly to overcome any weaknesses the other could exploit. The Sinaloa 
cartel’s ability to contract out and quickly develop new skills or replace pieces of the 
organization, such as replacing the New Generation after its split, allowed it to remain 
dominant throughout these many rivalries.229   
Furthermore, with a presence in approximately 50 countries and ties to numerous 
street gangs within the United States, including the Mexican Mafia, Hell’s Angels, and 
the Crips, the Sinaloa cartel’s alliance structure is vast and varied.230 As with counterparts 
in the legitimate economy, these partnerships are mostly based on expanding the brand 
and entering new markets to sustain a competitive edge. These networks provide 
operational stability within the Sinaloa cartel. Because of its highly decentralized 
structure, ripples of change at the top of the organization are unlikely to affect these 
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business relationships, and operations are likely to continue as normal. Furthermore, this 
network provides an extra layer of protection for the business of the cartel from 
leadership decapitation by limiting the impact of any changes at the top. 
4. Law Enforcement Efforts 
Law enforcement efforts should have impacted the Sinaloa cartel and produced 
similar results to those from violent rivalry; however, in this case it was not the presence 
of sustained law enforcement pressure that reduced the cartel’s vulnerability to 
decapitation, but just the opposite, as the lack of police pressure had the same effect.  It is 
likely that rampant corruption throughout the government of Mexico and its police force 
have provided protection for the cartel and its leaders.231 This protection provided a 
shield from leadership decapitation through shared intelligence and force multiplication. 
The intelligence could warn the cartel of pending leadership decapitation attempts or 
compromised locations, while the cartel may feed information to the police forces on 
rival cartels. This quasi-symbiotic relationship is subversive to rule of law and counter-
TCO efforts and make the organization less vulnerable to leadership decapitation 
attempts. In Guzman’s trial in the United States, phone records were submitted that 
captured him telling his lieutenants not to bother the police because they were allied with 
the cartel.232 In another call, he contacted a lieutenant to make sure the commander of the 
police force had received his bribe, and the commander was put on the phone to say he 
would take good care of Guzman’s business.233 Both of these instances paint a picture of 
the police force as an ally to the Sinaloa cartel rather than a violent rival as discussed in 
the previous case studies.  
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It is clear from these interactions that the Sinaloa cartel derived benefits from its 
relationship with law enforcement. It is likely that Guzman was notified when certain 
elements of the police force were notified of the location of his business interests or key 
personnel. It is even more likely that the Sinaloa cartel utilized this relationship in its 
other rivalries. When the Sinaloa cartel was expanding to new territory, it could give 
information to the police force on the locations of rivals’ key facilities that would need to 
be seized before it could wrest control. This relationship would give the police 
measurable results to pass to the superiors while opening the market for the expansion of 
the Sinaloa cartel. 
Although the Sinaloa cartel did not benefit from law enforcement efforts in a 
traditional manner as another type of violent rivalry, it nonetheless capitalized on its 
relationship with law enforcement to gain further protection from leadership decapitation 
by way of increased indications and warning of possible decapitation attempts. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Due to its decentralized structure, widespread popular support, history of 
incorporating lessons from violent rivalries, and capitalizing on corruption within law 
enforcement, the Sinaloa cartel was able to fortify its organization against vulnerabilities 
associated with leadership decapitation. In the business of narco-trafficking and 
transnational criminal behavior, this case study suggests that similarly structured 
organizations that employ the same tactics in regard to popular support, rivalries, and law 
enforcement, may not fall as easily following the arrest or death of their leaders. In 2017, 
approximately eight months after Guzman had been extradited to the United States, 
66 kilograms of fentanyl was seized in New York and linked back to the Sinaloa cartel.234 
This seizure was the largest recorded single seizure of fentanyl.235 This information, 
coupled with the DEA’s recent recognition of the Sinaloa cartel as one of the most 
significant Mexican TCOs in the United States, suggests that Guzman’s arrest has had 
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minimal impact on the organization.236 The fall of Guzman did not spell the end of the 
Sinaloa cartel, and it seems unlikely, based on the findings in this thesis and current 
evidence from Guzman’s trial, that his recent sentencing in the United States will have 
any further impact on its operations.237 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This thesis sought to answer two main questions: First, whether factors defined by 
literature on terrorist organizations could be applicable to analyzing the vulnerability of 
TCOs to leadership decapitation. Second, whether differences in core motivation—profit 
or ideology—had a significant impact on the vulnerability to leadership decapitation. 
While the results were not fully measurable in all case studies, there are overall 
observable results in each of these factors in each case study.238 
A. RESULTS 
Chapter I hypothesized that the same four factors that determine a terrorist 
organization’s vulnerability to leadership decapitation would be applicable to TCOs. 
Similarly, there is a potential for ancillary results based on the different motivations of 
the organizations-profit or ideology-that impact how the organization responds to 
leadership decapitation efforts: peace negotiations versus a fight until the end. 
Additionally, this chapter examined and defined the different factors from the literature 
and their potential to impact the vulnerability to leadership decapitation of the chosen 
case studies.  
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*Still exists as a political organization, although based on the last congressional election it is not 
a popular one.239 
Figure 6. Table of overall thesis findings for TCOs and the factors that impacted 
their vulnerability to leadership decapitation  
Chapters II through IV analyze historical case studies and determine their 
relevance in predicting the effectiveness of leadership decapitation. Figure 6 contains a 
summary of these findings, whether each factor contributed to the organization’s 
vulnerability to or protection from leadership decapitation, and the ultimate outcome. The 
Medellin and Cali cartels were defeated by leadership decapitation and were made 
vulnerable by all of the defined factors. Both organizations were highly centralized wheel 
networks with all power and authority held at the top of the organization before filtering 
down.240 This structure made them highly susceptible to leadership decapitation. The 
popular support for both groups was varied throughout Colombia’s population and tended 
to be localized rather than widespread leading to further vulnerability to leadership 
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decapitation.241 Despite having long histories of violent rivalries and protracted law 
enforcement efforts and well-developed alliance structures, neither the Medellin or Cali 
cartel gained protection from leadership decapitation from these factors. The literature 
suggested that these relationships should have highlighted organizational and operational 
vulnerabilities and then provided the operating space for them to make changes and 
adapt.242 However, neither organization addressed their organizational vulnerabilities and 
ultimately this led to a fatal vulnerability to leadership decapitation that was exploited by 
the Colombian strategy. 
The FARC case study highlighted some of the differences in outcome caused by a 
different core motivation. This organization was a violent insurgency with stated political 
goals that was funded through the illicit economy.243 It was still highly structured, but it 
did have a defined line of succession.244 Similar to the previous case studies, the FARC 
only enjoyed localized popular support, but it did apply lessons learned from violent 
rivalries and law enforcement to protect its organization. The FARC enjoyed protection 
from leadership decapitation in three of the four factors, but after multiple iterations of 
the decapitation strategy that led to the arrest or death of all seven members of the 
original Secretariat, the Colombian government was able to convince the FARC to 
engage in peace negotiations and eventually disarmament.245 The transitional outcome 
was likely only possible because of the political motivations of this organization that 
were used as a starting point for negotiations. It is unlikely this resolution would have 
been the same is the FARC’s motivation had been purely profit-driven. 
The Sinaloa case study in Chapter four analyzes these factors against what is 
currently the largest drug trafficking organization in the world. This cartel benefitted 
from protection against leadership decapitation in all four factors. This finding as well 
as the Sinaloa cartel’s continued operations past the arrest and extradition of its 
                                                 
241 Bowden, Killing Pablo, 24, 40, 50–53, 95; Chepesiuk, The Bullet or the Bribe, 147, 189–190. 
242 Jordan, “Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark”; Price, “Targeting Top Terrorists,” 27–28. 
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leader suggests that when all four factors are present, effective leadership decapitation to 
dissolve an organization is unlikely. And most significantly, the case of the Sinaloa cartel 
suggests that if other modern illicit organizations model themselves similarly, it is 
possible that the age of effective leadership decapitation to counter TCOs may come 
to an end.  
While the factors examined in this thesis are not necessarily mutually exclusive, 
they did, through application, display a cumulative effect. In these case studies, 
institutionalization had the greatest impact to an organization’s vulnerability to leadership 
decapitation and, in cases where the organization is heavily dependent on a handful 
of people for all decision-making, the other three factors cannot cumulatively overcome 
this flaw.  
B. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
As this thesis is being written, Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman’s trial is wrapping up 
and new information and findings about the Sinaloa cartel is being released.246 While this 
thesis incorporated as much of this material as was available, it is likely that additional 
and more detailed evidence could be used to further analyze this organization and provide 
more insight on why leadership decapitation failed to critically impact it.  
Furthermore, this thesis could provide a basis for research into the effectiveness 
of leadership decapitation as a public relations maneuver rather than a counter-TCO 
strategy. That is to say, could capturing or killing the leader of a TCO provide enough 
public backing to support an upcoming election or political policy? While the strategy 
may not impact the underlying issues or the overall organization, leadership decapitation 
could have secondary or tertiary order effects that are beneficial for foreign policy or 
domestic politics. 
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Finally, the knowledge generated in this thesis could be utilized in future research 
to help to expand the understanding of the operating environment as it pertains to 
countering these organizations and providing a critical understanding of when, where, 
and how to best counter TCOs along with those organizations’ efforts and resources.  
Additionally, future research could expand on the research contained in this thesis to 
determine whether the removal of key personnel, other than leaders, has an effect of 
disrupting or eliminating an organization and whether different methods of removal—
death or imprisonment—have an impact on its effectiveness. Moreover, future research 
could apply the same framework and factors to additional case studies or other areas of 
the international drug trade to determine its applicability across the field of study. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Overall, this thesis’ findings support the following four assessments. First, that the 
key factors of institutionalization, popular support, history with rivals and allies, and law 
enforcement efforts can assist in determining the potential effectiveness of leadership 
decapitation against a TCO. Second, that the outcome of leadership decapitation, whether 
negotiations can be employed to address concerns and the organization can peacefully 
transition to a legitimate organization, is heavily dependent on the inherent motivation of 
the organization. Third, the organization’s institutional structure is likely the most 
important factor when determining the organization’s vulnerability to leadership 
decapitation. Fourth, there can be a cumulative effect of the defined factors when 
determining the vulnerability to leadership decapitation.  
Leadership decapitation has been an effective strategy against transnational 
criminal organizations in the past, but history shows that this effectiveness is far from 
certain. As TCOs learn and adapt to government strategies, governments must continue to 
reevaluate their tactics for effectiveness. This thesis argues that governments and law 
enforcement organizations must learn from this history, or they may lose what has been 
an effective weapon in the fight against TCOs.  
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